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Document No. 109: Letter from Helmut Kohl to George H.W. Bush November 28, 1989
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611 Document No. 109: Letter from Helmut Kohl to george H.W. Bush November 28, 1989 This remarkable letter arrives at the White House at the very moment that Chancellor Kohl is surprising both the allies and the Soviets with his “10 Points” speech at the Bundestag in Bonn, pointing toward reunification. The letter is couched as a response to Bush’s repeated entreaties to Kohl (for example in phone calls on November 10 and 17) for his input before the Malta meeting with Gorbachev; in fact, Bush had practically implored Kohl to come and meet in person, but the chancellor demurred in order to tend to his domestic political situation. The letter has a much more formal tone than the telephone transcripts convey, likely due to the participation of Kohl’s aides in drafting and editing it. Here, the German leader encourages Bush to engage with Gorbachev across the board, but uses the president’s own mantra of “stability” to emphasize that “the most important decisions over stability or destabilization will be made by the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The duty of the West on the other hand must be to support the ongoing reform process from the outside.” Kohl emphasizes that “Western help is coming far too slowly” to Poland and Hungary in particular—a rebuke to Bush’s caution. Kohl also pays quite a compliment to Gorbachev, telling Bush that for the reform changes in Eastern Europe, “we have General Secretary Gorbachev’s policies to thank.” But all the Malta advice is really secondary to the letter’s final section laying out the “10 Points,” along with a personal appeal in which he attempts to cover his bases with Bush. Kohl’s aide, Horst Teltschik, had drafted the “10 Points” based largely on secret messages from Moscow—a gambit by Soviet expert Valentin Falin to spark a Kohl-Gorbachev dialogue on confederation. But Kohl rushed to go public, thinking Gorbachev was already on board (see pages 35-36, above). Kohl had informed neither the Americans nor the NATO allies (nor his own foreign minister ) in advance of his speech. Bush later wrote that Kohl was “[a]fraid of leaks, or perhaps of being talked out of it” and that “I was surprised, but not too worried,” because Kohl “couldn’t pursue reunification on his own.” Scowcroft was more concerned : “If he was prepared to go off on his own whenever he worried that we might object, we had very little influence.” Scowcroft commented that in his telephone conversation the next day, November 29, Kohl repeatedly “pledged that there would be no going it alone—only one day after he had, in fact, ‘gone it alone. ’”86 These phrases, such as “little influence” and “support … from the outside,” provide further testimony of how American policy lagged, instead of led, the miracles of 1989. Dear george, Thank you for your telephone request for information on the german situation for your upcoming meeting with general Secretary gorbachev in Malta. 86 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 194–196. See also Savranskaya essay, 35–36. Melyakova book.indb 611 2010.04.12. 16:21 612 I welcome this. This is a great sign of german–American friendship and partnership . At the same time, I would like to thank you for your friendly words in your Thanksgiving television address. In order to take full advantage of your offer, I ask that you understand that your meeting with general Secretary gorbachev will likely deal with themes that touch on the interests of the Federal Republic of germany and all germans. 1. MALTA PHILOSOPHY I am much obliged to you, george, for the clarity with which you have rejected every parallel between Yalta and Malta. I mention this point not from a german or European status perspective. My point is more that the historical reform process we are currently experiencing in East and Central Europe is not only proceeding in the direction of our Western values—free self-determination, democracy , private enterprise—but is also being carried out by the people themselves. Lech Wałęsa impressively underscored this recently in talks with you and before the Congress of the United States. That is why attempts to steer these reform developments from above or to channel or limit the movement of the people fail to meet the demands of this historic epoch. This is of course a consideration that applies to us and to our European neighbors. In this sense, the talks in...