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218 Document No. 34: Memorandum of Conversation between Erich Honecker and Fidel Castro February 28, 1981 Among Warsaw Pact leaders, East Germany’s Erich Honecker maintained the most hard-line stance toward the Polish crisis out of concern for its implications for communist authority in his own country. In this one-on-one session with Fidel Castro, he offers an “unvarnished” account of the Polish situation. He raises inter alia the subject of East German assistance to Poland, which includes both economic aid and intelligence information. He also gives a clear idea of the variety of ways Poland’s allies sought to apply pressure on Kania during the crisis. Castro, whose overriding interest is in guaranteeing Warsaw Pact support in the face of U.S. military threats against Cuba, asks a question on every observer’s mind—whether the Polish army can be trusted. Honecker replies: “For the time being, yes.” Memorandum of conversation of general Secretary of the SED CC Comrade Erich Honecker with First Secretary of the CC Communist Party of Cuba Comrade Fidel Castro (February 28, 1981, Moscow) The conversation took place in Moscow, in the margins of the XXXVI Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The following are only the passages relating to Poland. The meeting occurred at the request of Comrade Fidel Castro. […] Comrade Erich Honecker: First I would like to assure you, dear Comrade Fidel, of our complete solidarity. Especially now. The SED and the gDR stand firmly at your side. In regard to your question as to our opinion about the situation in Poland, I would like to say: We have direct, close contacts with the PUWP leadership. Their conduct since December’s Moscow meeting20 does not conform to our expectations. We see the Eighth Plenum of the PUWP CC and the appointment of Comrade Jaruzelski as prime minister as a significant step. However, between you and me, until now there have been no energetic efforts to smash the counter-revolution. Recently I had a personal meeting with Comrade Kania in the neighborhood of Berlin. I had the impression that the Polish leadership is hesitating a great deal. I handed Comrade Kania concrete materials about the activities of the CIA against Poland as well as exact evidence about the plans and activities of the new U.S. administration against Poland and the socialist community. I furthermore handed him extensive materials about the 20 The December 5, 1980, meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders (see Document No. 22). 219 counter-revolutionary activities inside Solidarity. Comrade Kania said he judged the situation exactly the way we do, but first the party itself has to be consolidated . I pointed out that it is decisive to choose the most favorable moment, not to waste it, to defeat the counter-revolution with military power and in cooperation with all healthy powers, and stabilize the workers’ and farmers’ power in Poland . These days in Poland there is a double authority; on the one side the party and the government, on the other side the hostile leadership in Solidarity and the clergy. It is good that Comrade Kania agreed to my proposal that direct ties between the party organizations of our districts and the voivodeship committees of the PUWP be continued. This way we can exercise influence. The worst is that the PUWP leadership and the government do not control the mass media—except Trybuna Ludu and the army newspaper. All other media are in the hands of revisionist forces. The counter-revolution itself produces newspapers, brochures, etc. It now rudely demands access to television and radio. The situation is extremely complicated. I am in permanent contact with Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and with Comrade Husák. We are trying to have the Polish comrades firmly take the initiative themselves to lead developments in a socialist direction. The gDR has provided great material solidarity. We have given the Polish leadership half a billion [Deutsch] marks in exchangeable currency. Polish deliveries to the gDR agreed to by treaty have not come through for as much as 1.9 billion (hard currency) marks. This is how the gDR makes great material sacrifices. We expect that the Polish leadership will act in accordance with the Moscow decisions and its bilateral assurances to us. Very serious is the fact that the counterrevolution can campaign legally. The only positive aspect is the appointment of Comrade Jaruzelski, which creates the possibility of announcing a state of siege at the right moment to smash...

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