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Aims in Games and Moral Purposes LORÁND AMBRUS-LAKATOS In “Deliberation is of Ends” ,1 Aurel Kolnai argues against what he takes to be a fundamental doctrine of Aristotle’s ethics, that deliberation is of means, of means for the attainment of the supreme final end, which in turn could be glossed as happiness.2 But there is no such final end. Deliberation is, instead, of the “conspectus” of autonomous ends that might be more or less permanently present in our lives.3 Concerning the ethical “side” of this issue, Kolnai claims that “morality turns on cherishing one sovereign right end” , that is, the virtuous man desires to lead a morally good life (DE 56). If there were one overarching end that is not strictly speaking moral, then morality would be debased to the level of instrumentality. If, on the other hand, there were a single ultimate end and this were taken as that of being moral, then there would be no room for practices that are morally neutral. However, the pursuit of the moral end cannot encompass all the worthy and autonomous pursuits we might have: [E]ven a man endowed with the keenest sense of honesty does not as a rule make business transactions from the motive of practising the virtue of honesty, and the rules of honesty tell him no more in what business transactions he should engage than the rules of chess tell the player what moves he should make in order to win the game. (DE 57) Several questions remain. Suppose it is a matter of choice whether the main moral aim is included in the ensemble of ends we pursue. To allow this possibility, it seems, would also amount to lowering the status of morality. Take also into account that, according to Kolnai, while ideals are chosen instead of being imposed by rational evidence, the main moral end is not an ideal. Then if we ineluctably respond to the demands of the main moral end, and if deliberation is of ends, that is, of which ends we are to regard as our own when faced with the necessity to make choices, why and how do we deliberate about it? Also, can there then be a serious conflict between pursuing the moral end and seeking our non-moral ultimate ends? EXPLORING THE WORLD OF HUMAN PRACTICE Both of these questions could possibly be answered by stating first that the moral end is not monolithic; it has an internal structure. However, if, for instance, its pursuit consists in obeying a set of rules, as the above quotation actually suggests, it is still hard to see what role deliberation can play in moral practice. Either there is a supreme moral principle or the moral agent has to seek consistency between the various rules, and the thesis according to which deliberation is of ends is still hard pressed, irrespective of which of these alternatives is adopted. In this paper I seek to present a view on Kolnai’s conception of the main moral end and of moral deliberation.4 My starting hypotheses are that indeed for him this aim is complex and that it has to reflect the structure of the moral demands we have to face. Section I introduces Kolnai’s analysis of games playing, in the framework of which his conception of how and what aims are pursued in certain important essentially social practices can be presented. Section II describes his position on how our moral purposes fit into this conception, and section III examines critically this position. Finally, section IV offers an account of how Kolnai thinks of the structure of moral demands, and proceeds to discuss how these ideas relate to the understanding of what our moral purposes are and what their structure is. I Kolnai’s main task in his essay “Games and Aims”5 is to present a philosophical analysis of the social practice of games playing. At the very beginning of this work, after considering two opinions on the importance of this subject, he quotes approvingly this passage: The theory of Games is never likely to provide a calculus of Morals; but it may well provide models on which to sharpen our logical teeth and develop our moral sense.6 (GA 103) This quotation then introduces another theme: what lessons for moral philosophy can be derived from a study of games, from the phenomenology , as it were, of what it is to play them? However, the theory of games that...

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