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Document No. 85: Minutes of the Romanian Politburo Meeting, November 24, 1978 ——————————————————————————————————————————— These Romanian Politburo minutes deal largely with a recent PCC meeting where the USSR had pressed for affirmation of the rights and prerogatives of the Warsaw Pact supreme commander in war time. In 1969, the alliance had approved a similar statute for peace time (Document No. 62b), but the war time equivalent had been postponed for several years because of ongoing objections by member-states. As this record shows, the Romanians continued to oppose the idea. They argued that there was no trend toward war, as the Soviets were insisting, and demanded cuts in military spending instead. They specifically criticized “Soviet militarist circles” and objected to the member-states’ obligation to bear the costs of Moscow’s “adventurous” policy. Finally, Ceaușescu remarked that the difference between the two alliances’ determination to pursue the current arms race was that “NATO’s decision is public, and ours is secret.” Romania’s objections continued to delay final adoption of the statute until March 1980 (see Document No. 86). An interesting fact that emerged from this episode was that the PCC by this time had evolved into a venue where military matters were increasingly being discussed— a different situation from the early 1970s when it was a forum mainly for political matters such as the CSCE. ____________________ Cde. Manea Mănescu: […] I want to refer to the intervention—firm, principled, bearing special patriotic and revolutionary responsibility for the present and the future of our country, and, I would say, for the other socialist countries as well— which Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu made at the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty states regarding the Report on the military situation , and the decision related to this report. […] After Marshal [Viktor] Kulikov presented the report, Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu took the floor and criticized the working procedures, and the technique of drawing up materials of special significance, which commit the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty on crucial issues of peace and war, the arms race, disarmament, and international détente. Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu pointed out from the very beginning that the report and the decision did not result in a comradely collaboration of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty, and that a decision can only be made on the basis of common agreement, in accordance with the provisions of the acts and norms that guide the activity of the Political Consultative Committee. Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu also pointed out that the estimates of the ratio of forces are made on the basis of erroneous, even false data, that issues are raised as if a world war were imminent, which is in total contradiction with the first document and the debates that took place on it. 422 In fact, Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu drew very serious attention to the responsibility we have to analyze the present situation objectively, make correct political assessments , and not fall prey to militarism, which would bring about incalculable consequences for the future of mankind. (It would force the Warsaw Treaty states to make investments and incur exorbitant material and financial costs, which would constitute a heavy burden for the people, with negative consequences for economic and social development, and for the living standards of the people). On the contrary, as Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu showed in his first exposé, our countries have to lead by example as far as measures for reducing military expenditures, independent of the measures the NATO countries take, since this would have a highly positive influence on the peoples’ fight for peace and détente in the world. Actually, the Report is an emanation of Soviet militarist circles, which are pursuing a policy of excessive armament by replacing current weapons, involving the Warsaw Treaty states in a dangerous arms race, and having them bear the costs arising from this adventurous way of acting. The Report included conclusions intended to justify the so-called necessity course; namely, in case of necessity, command of Warsaw Treaty troops should be transferred to the Soviet General Staff, with all the consequences deriving from this fact regarding the independence and sovereignty of our country and of other socialist countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty. This would give the Soviet Union the possibility to interfere in the internal affairs of our countries. I must tell you that Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu was listened to with a good deal of attention by...

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