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Document No. 72: Minutes of Romanian Politburo Meeting Concerning the Ceaușescu–Brezhnev Conversation, May 20, 1970 ——————————————————————————————————————————— Several of the documents in this volume illuminate Romania’s unique role as maverickwithintheWarsawPact .ThisreportbyNicolaeCeaușescutotheRomanianPolitburo about a meeting with Leonid Brezhnev gives a fascinating look—albeit from one side— atthepersonalrelationshipsbetweentheRomanianandSovietleaders,andatRomanian opinions of the Soviets. Although he may tend to embellish his account, Ceaușescu probably also felt a need to be reasonably accurate in conveying such important information to his colleagues. Not surprisingly, Brezhnev’s main purpose at the meeting was to complain about Romania’s position within the Warsaw Pact and its foreign policy in general. In his version of events, Ceaușescu refuted each point and regularly put the Soviets on the defensive. At one point, a Romanian official says, they turned green. The Romanians’ contempt for the Soviet leadership comes through most starkly in the comments of Politburo member Emil Bodnăraș, who says they looked “pathetic” and displayed “complete incompetence and weakness,” proving that they are “prisoners of the apparatus ” and incapable of thinking independently. This almost verbatim account of the Politburo discussion gives a vivid sense of the free-flowing, almost rambling quality of Ceaușescu’s speech and shows how he dominated the discussions behind closed doors. ____________________ […] Cde. N. Ceaușescu: […] We spoke first and, for a little more than an hour we spoke, in the spirit of our discussion here in the Executive Committee, regarding some of our general concerns; of course, stressing economic problems. […] Then Brezhnev started speaking. He began with a history of the relationship between the CPSU and the PCR, saying that there were many positive elements: he mentioned the exchanges of delegations in the past year—seven from us, participation in ideological reunions by them. There were also exchanges of technical documentation—they gave us 3,000 pages and we gave them 1,200—as well as cultural exchanges, what we gave them and what they gave us. [Brezhnev said] there are issues of common interest, that both they and we appreciate the leading role of the party. After that he said that there are also a number of disagreements, especially as concerned the political realm. And he began by saying that that is a consequence of the fact that Romania’s position is opposed to that of the socialist countries. Of course, it is the right of every party to establish its own general political line, the direction of its foreign policy, but that on vital issues we should come to a consensus. There are instances in which Romania took a common position, but there are issues on which Romania did not act in common and even acted demonstratively. Cde. Ștefan Voicu: Twice or three times he underlined “demonstratively.” 365 Cde. N. Ceaușescu: And he began with the Federal Republic of Germany; that it is true that at the consultative meeting in 196615 it was discussed that, after all, the establishment of diplomatic relations would serve as an encouragement to the FRG government, that, of course, maybe you had economic incentives. [But that] underlines more the policies of [West German Chancellor Willy] Brandt and not of the GDR, and that in the future it will be necessary for us to consult in the spirit of what had been decided in December 1966. After that, he mentioned the issue of the Middle East. He began again with the causes of the conflict with Israel, that we did not qualify Israel as an aggressor state, that, after all, this was encouraging the aggressor. [He mentioned] that we did not participate in the meeting in Prague,16 that they have information that a lot of Jews are emigrating from Romania, some of them young males who are eligible for military service; that Romania received credits from Israel, etc. More so, the formalization of the relationship with Israel shows that Romania is distancing itself from the class position on this issue. Then there was Nixon’s visit17—that this was a slap in the face for the progressive movement. That at a time when there was a war in Vietnam, when the Americans were doing this and that in Vietnam, that was the time when we received him, that we received him right before the [party] Congress and that we even postponed the Congress in preparation for this visit. Considering this, how was he [Brezhnev] supposed to come to Romania. I did, among other things, complain that he did...

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