In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Document No. 65: Polish Army Report on East German Misbehavior during the “Oder–Neisse-69” Exercise, October 22, 1969 ——————————————————————————————————————————— Despite efforts at the leadership levels to find common ground within the Warsaw Pact, relationships among the supposedly fraternal parties at lower echelons were often quite raw. This Polish report describes with some feeling a variety of transgressions committed by German soldiers on Polish territory during the recent “Oder–Neisse” exercises . The document, from the Main Political Administration of the Polish Armed Forces, mentions that the East Germans still have a guilt complex about the last war but also show scorn for Polish organizational abilities and suspicion that the Poles are seeking rapprochement with West Germany over their heads. East German officers, the report complains, boast of a special relationship between Berlin and Moscow and show considerable lack of tact, for example by relishing the fact that some of their troops crossed over the Polish border on the anniversary of Hitler’s invasion. Specific misdeeds ranged from the petty—throwing candy to children and taking pictures—to the serious, including a charge of rape, undoubtedly recalling some of Poland’s bitter experiences at German hands during World War II. ____________________ […] Duringthe“Oder–Neisse”maneuvers,[…]theattitudesoftheNVA4 GDRofficers and conscripts serving on the territory of the PPR were dominated by guilty feelings caused by the previous historical period. […] The German comrades have very strongly emphasized their ideological and spiritual allegiance to the defensive union of the Warsaw Treaty’s socialist states. During the “Oder–Neisse-69” exercise, the abovementioned guilty feelings of the NVA GDR units operating on PPR territory were replaced by distinct self-confidence. One can conclude from our finding that the NVA GDR comrades put a lot of effort into the organizational and propaganda preparations of the military for the exercises. However, it is noteworthy that these preparations were directed almost solely at popularizing the GDR and its political and economic achievements. […] […] According to our finding, during the preparation period for these exercises among the NVA GDR units, a special briefing took place during which peace initiatives of the party leadership and government of the PPR were not always accurately interpreted, especially in relation to the FRG. Proposals by the Polish side were represented as an attempt to establish relations between Poland and the FRG, excluding the GDR. These theories were conveyed by a number of the NVA GDR officers during conversations with Polish citizens. For example, during a meeting of the leadership of the orchestra representing the Neubrandenburg Military District with the factory council and directors of the porcelain factory in Chodzież, the leader 4 Nationale Volksarmee (National People’s Army). 339 of this orchestra appealed to those gathered that “the government of the PPR should not engage in talks with West Germany.” During talks with Polish Army officers, comrades from the NVA GDR were skeptical about the PPR’s agricultural policies. They stressed that in their opinion a better solution in this matter would be to adopt the GDR’s agricultural policies as a model. They have frequently boasted about the GDR’s economic successes and high living standards. They have credited these achievements to politics of the SED and industriousness of the German nation. […] During their stay on the territory of PPR, especially during the first phase of the exercises, comrades from the NVA GDR displayed excessive levels of self-confidence as mentioned above, particularly by overestimating their own and underestimating our organizational skills. […] […] Some officers of the NVA GDR political apparatus have committed blunders of substantial significance through their actions. These officers have over-emphasized the bond between the GDR and the USSR, repeatedly omitting their partnership with the entire socialist camp. Their attitude has troubled the Soviet comrades. This stance seems to arise from the fact that due to the GDR’s strong economic standing, politically less mature officers of the NVA GDR consider their country to be the main partner of the USSR. […] In their contacts with the Polish side, certain comrades from the NVA GDR did not always display adequate political tact. This may be demonstrated by the NVA’s proposal to have some of their training units cross the PPR border at dawn on September 1 of this year—precisely on the 30th anniversary of Hitler’s invasion of Poland. […] Also symptomatic is the fact that during official meetings NVA GDR officers making presentations have never used phrases...

Share