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Document No. 55: Czechoslovak and East German Views on the Warsaw Pact, July 1968 ——————————————————————————————————————————— The two documents reproduced here show the different perspectives held by the Czechoslovak reformers and the conservative East Germans. Both records are from July 1968, when the Czechoslovak crisis had already escalated. The first document precedes the crucial July 14–15 Warsaw meeting of Warsaw Pact members—minus Czechoslovakia and Romania—at which the remaining five countries’ leaders reached a consensus on the probable need for military intervention in Czechoslovakia (see Document No. 54). The memorandum is intended to preempt the spreading criticism of Czechoslovakia as being disloyal to the alliance. It apparently resulted from a conference of representatives of reformist and conservative groups within the armed forces held in Bratislava. It summarizes the position which the reformist group thought Czechoslovakia should take in the Warsaw Pact—acting as not only a disciplined and responsible , but also a creative and active, member of the alliance. The second item below, an East German document, was prepared on July 29, after the so-called Prchlík affair (see footnote 22 for Document No. 52) and the summit of five Warsaw Pact member-states in the Polish capital (Document No. 54). That meeting resulted in the transmittal of the so-called “Warsaw Letter” warning the Czechoslovak leadership of possible military action if the reform movement were not terminated swiftly. The document below is an analysis and interpretation of the Warsaw Treaty, and is obviously intended to justify the forthcoming intervention. It says specifically that by not taking part in the Warsaw meeting, Czechoslovakia has violated provisions of the alliance requiring consultation in the event other signatories perceive a danger to their security. At best, this view could be said to represent a loose construction of the alliance treaty, if not an outright distortion. ____________________ a) Czechoslovak Reformist Memorandum on the Warsaw Treaty and Czechoslovakia, July 1968 The government of the ČSSR has been deeply convinced of the historic importance of the founding and existence of the Warsaw Treaty on friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance among our countries, as well as of the establishment of the Unified Armed Forces of the countries participating in the Pact. The Pact is our common response to the activities of the aggressive imperialist forces, the NATO military grouping in particular. […] Currently, we are once again seeking to increase our active share in the joint defense of the Warsaw Treaty states, as we do not want to be a mere passive member . 302 This fundamental line arises from both the action program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and the programmatic declaration of the ČSSR government. In the CPCz action program, it is explicitly declared that: “The basic orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy, born and affirmed in times of the national liberation struggle and in the process of the socialist reconstruction of our country, is toward the alliance and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. We will be striving to further intensify relations with our allies— the countries of the world socialist community—on the basis of mutual esteem, sovereignty and equality, respect and international solidarity. In this sense, we will contribute to joint activities of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty, in a more active way and with a well thought-out conception.” In the program declaration of the ČSSR government, it is also stated that: “As long as NATO exists, we will co-operate to secure the Warsaw Treaty, strive for the Czechoslovak People’s Army to become a firm link in this alliance and develop greater initiative to intensify the work of the Unified Command.” This stand of the ČSSR is confirmed by our deeds, through which we honor the respective resolutions of the Warsaw Treaty and the instructions of the supreme commander of the Unified Armed Forces, as evident from the solution of problems concerning the build-up of the Czechoslovak armed forces, from their combat readiness, and the fulfillment of assignments during alliance exercises, and from combat and political preparation in general. The baseline of securing the Warsaw Pact has finally been manifested in the efforts of the ČSSR in implementing the Soviet Union’s suggestions, which were included in the letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of January 7, 1966, in which it is also stated that: “The basic sense of these suggestions, as we see it...

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