In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Document No. 50: Memorandum of the Academic Staff of the Czechoslovak Military Academies on Czechoslovakia’s Defense Doctrine, June 4, 1968 ——————————————————————————————————————————— Sometimes referred to in Western literature as the Gottwald memorandum, this document was prepared by the staffs of the Klement Gottwald Military Political Academy in Prague and the Antonín Zápotocký Military Technical Academy in Brno. Its authors were official theoreticians who by this time had become reformers, and as such had moved in their thinking much farther than the Dubček leadership. Although the memorandum was originally intended for party leaders, it also was published in the newspapers on July 2, which must certainly have alarmed the Soviets because its ideas were quite unorthodox. Despite the use of Marxist jargon it contained some very commonsense judgments, many of which were ahead of their time. Among its noteworthy points are the argument that nuclear deterrence was irrelevant to small countries like Czechoslovakia that were not in a position to implement it; the statement that future security policy should be European-based and aimed at reducing tensions; and the view that crises such as in Berlin and Cuba must be avoided because of their adverse economic effects quite apart from the terrible military threats they engender. ____________________ Formulation and Constitution of Czechoslovak State Interests in the Military Area The draft of the action program of the Czechoslovak People’s Army poses with particular urgency the question of elaborating the state military doctrine of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In our opinion, the point of departure ought to be the state interests of Czechoslovakia in the military area which, however, have not yet been formulated and constituted. The signatories of this memorandum, who are scholarly associates working for the Czechoslovak armed forces, wish to contribute to the scientific examination and formulation of those state interests. In sections 1 and 2, they express their position concerning the present state of our military doctrine and military policy. In sections 3 and 4, they outline the procedure for a theoretical examination of the data aimed at the formulation of doctrinal conclusions. In section 5, they justify the necessity of using scientific methods to solve these problems. They are sending this memorandum to provide the basis for an exchange of opinion . They consider a dialogue necessary for the development of scientific research. 270 Prague, May 1968 1. Political and Military Doctrine 1.1. The political doctrine of a socialist state is primarily influenced by the choice of wider goals within the international community and its relationship with the diverse forces representative of social progress. The principle of socialist internationalism is organically linked with the national responsibility of a sovereign state. This is normally more important as well as more difficult the smaller the physical power of the state. The choice cannot solely depend on “national interest,” which cannot be defined in a pure form—neither as an interest of one’s own state, nor as an interest of the leading state of a coalition. The interestofthesocietalmovement ,ofwhichsovereignstatesareapart,isdecisive,specifically the interest of European socialism and its dynamic development. Mere defense of what has been accomplished fosters stagnation and degeneration; the wrong choice of an offensive strategy has a destructive effect on the progress of the whole societal movement. 1.2. Military policy as an aggregate of actions in military matters implements military interests and needs through a chosen strategy. In regard to national interest, the military doctrine of the state can be described as a comprehensive formulation of its military interests and needs. The doctrine is a binding theoretical and ideological base for the formulation of military policy and the resulting measures as well as for negotiations with the alliance partners. It amounts to a compromise between the maximum requirements and actualresources ,betweenthedynamicsoftheevolvingmilitaryknowledgeandthefindings of the social sciences, between the development of technology and the requirement of an effective defense system corresponding to the military circumstances at any given time. 1.3. The formulation of the state’s military doctrine influences retroactively its political doctrine and strategy. It substantially affects its capability to project itself internationally by nonmilitary means. Giving up one’s own military doctrine means giving up responsibility for one’s own national and international action. A surrender to spontaneity , this entails the de-politicization of military thought, which in turn leads to a paralysis of the army. It is the fundamental source of crisis of the army organism by tearing it out of...

Share