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Document No. 44: Report on the State of the Bulgarian Army in the Wake of the Middle East War, October 7, 1967 ——————————————————————————————————————————— The June 1967 Arab–Israeli war came as a shock to the Warsaw Pact. Because Israel was armed and backed by the United States, the performance of the Israeli army in its crushing defeat of the Arabs was seen as indicative of how NATO might perform in war time. At least two high-level meetings evaluated the war’s impact from the military , political, and economic points of view. At a July 11 conference of party chiefs, Brezhnev complained about Middle Eastern clients he could not control: “It’s not Europe, where we have the iron thumb.”11 The document presented here, from the Bulgarian archives, is an assessment of the state of the Bulgarian army in light of the recent conflict. Its firm conclusion is that the army would be entirely unprepared for any such engagement. Extrapolating the Middle East experience to a scenario the Bulgarians might face, Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov declares that particularly in the case of a surprise attack from Greece or Turkey, his army would be unable to counter in either direction. This view contrasted with NATO estimates from the 1950s, according to which the Greek army was in such a poor state that it would be unable to hold back a Bulgarian assault even for a short period.12 ____________________ Protocol “B” No. 8 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party October 17, 1967 Agenda: On the status of the Bulgarian Armed Forces in light of events in the Middle East. Decisions: 1. The report of the leadership of the Ministry of People’s Defense on the status of the Bulgarian Armed Forces has been approved. The considerations of the Ministry on enhancing the combat readiness and combat capabilities of the armed forces, and the proposals made in this respect during the Politburo meeting shall be taken into account by the Ministry of People’s Defense in its future activities. 11 Record of meeting, Budapest, 11–12 July 1967, in The Soviet Bloc and the Aftermath of the June 1967 War: Selected Documents from East-Central European Archives, ed. James G. Hershberg for the conference, “The United States, the Middle East, and the 1967 Arab–Israeli War,” Department of State, Washington, 12–13 January 2004, pp. 12–52, at p. 23. 12 John O. Iatrides, “Failed Rampart: NATO’s Balkan Front,” paper presented at the conference, “NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intra-Bloc Conflicts,” Kent State University, 23–24 April 2004. 245 2. BasedontheagreementinprinciplebetweenCde.TodorZhivkovandCde.Leonid Brezhnev on the role, tasks and development of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, Cde. Dobri Djurov, after specifying the strength of the Bulgarian Armed Forces with the State Defense Committee, shall put forward the issue to the respective Soviet bodies to solve the problems resulting from this. Signed: (Todor Zhivkov) Report on the status of the Bulgarian Armed Forces in light of events in the Middle East […] This report will deal with the status of intelligence, combat and mobilization readiness , training of commanders, staffs and troops, and the political and morale status, discipline and logistical support of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. In our opinion, these are the main factors having an impact on the combat readiness and combat capabilities of the armed forces. As seen from the analysis above, serious failures in those areas caused the defeat of the Arab countries. […] 1. Status of intelligence in the Bulgarian Armed Forces […] I need to report, however, that we have not yet reached a turning point in our effort to enhance intelligence to the level of modern requirements and it does not meet the demands of the armed forces and the country. Strategic intelligence meets the most urgent peacetime demands of supplying information related to the composition, organization, grouping, armament and operational –tactical concepts of the Turkish and Greek Armed Forces. [Our] intelligence, however, has no sources available to reveal the enemy’s intentions for unexpected invasion, which, taking into account the experience of events in the Middle East is of paramount importance for the defense of the country. In addition, the main source for supplying information about our enemy is the intelligence service personnel, working under cover in our official missions abroad. We will not be able to rely on them in a complex situation or in time of war, and thus we will lack the necessary...

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