In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Document No. 12: Warsaw Pact Views of NATO’s Plans and Capabilities, April 28, 1960 ——————————————————————————————————————————— This Czechoslovak General Staff description shows what information the Soviets and their allies had about NATO’s views of war and how they interpreted them. NATO’s strategy is accurately described as including the option of a surprise attack, but what is left out is the fact that the West contemplated this action only in response to an imminent Soviet offensive. Considerable detail is provided about NATO’s preparedness to launch massive nuclear strikes against Warsaw Treaty air defenses and command centers , in order to prevent Soviet bloc forces from advancing beyond the Vistula and Danube rivers and Carpathian mountains. NATO’s aim is described as being to knock out the peripheral countries of the Warsaw Pact (those lying between the Soviet Union and NATO), to occupy these countries and to fight the Soviet Union on its own territory . The materials also assume that Western nuclear bombers and missiles would reach Czechoslovakia within 20–25 minutes, and would be able to cover the entire country. However, the document ends on the reassuring note that complete surprise is unlikely to be achieved (see also Document No. 15). It is difficult to tell from this document to what extent it was based on publicly available materials as distinguished from intelligence. It is known that NATO was first hoping to stop the Soviets at the Rhine and later do its best to hold them as close to West Germany’s eastern border as possible, but there is no indication from available evidence that NATO had any hopes to advance as deep as this description shows—to occupy all of Eastern Europe and fight on Soviet territory. This document thus appears to contradict everything that is known about NATO’s capabilities and how the alliance perceived itself.ItispossibleeitherthattheSoviets,everimpressedbyWesterntechnologicalprowess, saw NATO as more capable than it actually was, or conceivably that the Soviet military was attempting to alarm the East Europeans by exaggerating the West’s intentions. ____________________ 1. […] Opinions regarding the conduct of war in its early stages Insofar as its preparations for a new war of aggression are concerned, the general approach of the West is based on assumptions that the future “major” war will be a global conflict, waged by coalitions of states, affecting all aspects of the lives of nations both on the frontline and in the rear, and taking place in every war theater of the world. […] It is expected that the achievement of operational and strategic surprise and the massive use of weapons of mass destruction, which should swing the balance in favor of the attacker even when the ratio of forces does not play into the attacker’s hands at the outbreak of hostilities, will play a key role in bringing the war to an early end. Basically, these requirements are also reflected in the West’s concept of how the war will be initiated. 105 Preparations for mounting the aggression are being carried out in a planned fashion , under the guise and pretext of day-to-day activities, the purpose being to allow the opponent to grow accustomed to an escalation of activities and to blunt his concentration . Thus, readiness for war should be achieved in stages, through step-bystep incremental changes, so as not to draw attention, and the long-term implementation of extraordinary measures that are expected to give the impression of normalcy by being regularly repeated. Thus, we have been witnessing combat alerts, air intrusion warnings, sorties with nuclear or hydrogen bombs on board, etc. with increasing frequency. The combat alerts invariably involve large-scale troop movements, and develop into tactical exercises and maneuvers on an ever increasing scale. They usually stop at the border of the Warsaw Treaty, in major operational assembly areas. […] All the measures referred to above are implemented step-by-step and in such a manner as to appear “defensive,” not just in the eyes of the general public but also to members of the Western armed forces. The examples outlined above indicate that the concept of initiating war is, beyond any doubt, based on surprise, which is expected to play the most important role in the early stage of the war, and thus also in its further course. […] The most opportune moment for launching this kind of a surprise attack is believed to be [at the discovery of] any deficiency or lag in the combat and political preparedness of Warsaw...

Share