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Document No. 138: East German Evaluation of NATO’s 1988 Exercises, November 15, 1988 ——————————————————————————————————————————— This report of various Western maneuvers continues in the vein of previous assessments of the threat of a surprise attack. Throughout the 1980s, these fears persisted, encouraged by NATO’s growing ability to stop advancing enemy forces by swift air attacks to their rear, and by events such as NATO’s “Able Archer 83” exercise which was meant to simulate the release of nuclear weapons, but because of its use of encrypted codes could have been misread as an indication that a surprise attack might be forthcoming. During the Gorbachev period, the Warsaw Pact continued to upgrade, including maritime operations forces such as would have been needed to counter “Team Work 88,” analyzed below. Within a month, however, Gorbachev would address the United Nations with a radical plan to reduce troop strength in Europe. ____________________ […] 1. Our estimate has been confirmed that NATO aims to achieve a favorable relationship between the intended surprise and the strong offensive forces necessary for a successful conventional war in Central Europe. On the one hand, under the cover of exercises across almost the entire front, approximately 40 percent of combat-ready units were deployed within 24 hours. On the other hand, 41,000 troops stationed in the Netherlands and Belgium were transferred to the FRG; and the NATO armed forces in Central Europe and the Baltic region were, within a period of 5 to 8 days, reinforced with 70,000 mobilized troops and strategic reserves. As a result, NATO has proven its increased capability to make available relatively covertly within 10 days enough military force for its main theater of war during a conventional war. The air force has proven that, as a part of NATO’s forces, it could begin a war within 12 to 24 hours with a massive surprise attack. The navy exercise “Team Work 88” demonstrated that NATO is in a position to bring the bulk of its fleet into position in 5 days and intervene in a land battle. 2. During the fall exercises, a stronger shift towards conventional warfare was clearly noticeable. In all exercises, the offensive forces predominated. […] 3. The close connection between strategic forces during the exercises as well as the goals and results clearly demonstrate that the strategic operations of NATO’s forces in Central Europe are increasingly characterized by land-air warfare. […] The air force was responsible for offensive operations into the depth of Warsaw Pact territory. 621 […] NATO counts on rendering the Warsaw Pact’s operational airfields useless for 6 to 8 hours and destroying on the ground the aircraft that have been diverted to secondary and less well defended airfields. […] 4. The naval exercises were coordinated even more closely [than before] with the land and air exercises and, particularly in the Baltic and Norwegian Seas, fully integrated with them. The sea operations were characterized by the “maritime forward strategy.” The essence of this strategy is the rapid achievement of naval supremacy in the Atlantic and its adjacent seas by cutting off and destroying the Warsaw Pact navies at their bases. […] 5. Training in the use of nuclear weapons during the NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe exercise “Able Archer 88”19 was limited to a selective first and second strike. With a selective first and second strike, the NATO states would use the threat of nuclear war to force the Warsaw Pact to surrender. NATO hopes that a cease-fire with one of the socialist states would have the long-term effect of breaking up the community of socialist states. Chemical weapons would also be used in conventional warfare for tactical and operational reasons. […] Conclusions – NATO continues to practice each fall the deployment of massive military forces in exercise areas near the border, thereby producing an acute military threat that violates the spirit of the Stockholm Accord.20 At the same time, NATO is shifting towards exercise methods that allow for possible broader confidence-building measures, or achieve approximately the same goals with fewer participants. – The growing complexity of the exercises, their growing mutual coordination, the training of the staff and troops at the army group level and the more effective incorporation of territorial forces, civilian officials and organizations in the fall exercises allow NATO to test its offensive plans in a more realistic fashion and make their implementation more effective. […] [Source: VA-01/39538, BA-MA. Translated by Catherine Nielsen.] 19...

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