A Cardboard Castle?: An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991

Document No. 116: Report to the Bulgarian Politburo on Romanian Arms Reduction Proposals, September 22, 1986

Document No. 116: Report to the Bulgarian Politburo on Romanian Arms Reduction Proposals, September 22, 1986 ——————————————————————————————————————————— In this report to the Bulgarian Politburo, Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov describes the state of recent Romanian efforts to get the Warsaw Pact to initiate unilateral arms cuts. Despite Gorbachev’s more open attitude on such questions, the rest of the alliance, including the Soviets, balk at the idea once more. Mladenov suggests that the issue be tabled temporarily. ____________________ Ministry of Foreign Affairs 01-05-10 To: Politburo of CC of BCP Comrades, In his statements at Warsaw Pact forums, RCP [Romanian Communist Party] General Secretary and President of Romania Nicolae Ceaușescu proposed several times that Warsaw Pact countries should unilaterally freeze and reduce their force levels and military expenditures. At the PCC Sofia meeting (1985), the Romanian party laid out this proposal as a condition for signing the closing documents. As a result, at the Warsaw meeting (March 19–20, 1986) it was decided that the CMFA had to create an Expert Group for examining this possibility. At the Third Congress of the Working People [trade unions] of Romania, held in the beginning of September 1986, Ceaușescu called on all European states to reduce their armaments by at least 5 percent. Following a referendum, the Congress adopted a decision to reduce Romanian armaments, forces and military expenses by 5 percent till the end of the year. On September 11 and 12, 1986, the allied countries’ Working Group held a meeting in Bucharest. The Warsaw Pact delegations succeeded in avoiding the discussion put forward by Romania regarding the reduction mentioned above. They stated that it was not possible to take unilateral actions because these would harm their security , having in mind the fragile equality existing between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Army General Staff representative proved on the basis of facts that U.S. and NATO military programs aim at achieving military superiority over the Warsaw Pact. The coordinated position for adhering strictly to the equality principle as the only possible basis for disarmament agreements was confirmed. As a result of the efforts of the six allied countries, the Romanian proposal was neutralized to a great extent. That’s why the Romanian representatives insisted on a second session of the Group before the CMFA meeting in Bucharest, set for October 16 and 17, 1986. 539 In this connection, I consider it expedient that the Bulgarian experts delegation, which will participate in the second session of the Working Group, express the official statement of PR [People’s Republic] of Bulgaria. At the present it is not in our country’s interest to carry out the proposed unilateral 5 percent reduction of forces, armaments and military expenses. Such a step would invalidate the Budapest proposal to NATO for simultaneous and substantial reductions of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.56 With friendly greetings, [signed] P. Mladenov [Source: Fond 1, Opis 11a, a.e. 353, pp. 33, Bulgarian State Security Archives, AMVR. Translated by Vania Petkova.] 56 Appeal of the Budapest meeting of the PCC, 11 June 1986. See also document no. 115. 540 ...