In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Document No. 100: East German Summary of Warsaw Pact Summit in Moscow, June 28, 1983 ——————————————————————————————————————————— The main purpose of this Warsaw Pact leadership meeting in Moscow was to assess the impending introduction of Euromissiles—intermediate-range missiles intended to counter the same kind of missiles already deployed by the Soviet Union—which by now was regarded as all but certain. If the missiles were deployed, the Soviet Union would have to live up to its stated intention to walk out of the Geneva talks, the only still ongoing East–West arms control negotiations. Andropov’s message to his colleagues is that the Warsaw Pact must not allow the West to achieve military superiority through deployment of the new missiles. The question was what measures should be taken. Options ranged from deploying counter-missiles near the borders of Western countries that accepted Euromissiles to having individual Warsaw Pact member-states influence their NATO counterparts not to go ahead with the deployments. One conclusion that can be drawn from the second proposal is that by this time Moscow had become more dependent on its allies than in previous decades. ____________________ […] 1. The Moscow meeting, which took place on initiative of the USSR half a year after the Prague session of the Political Consultative Committee of the states of the Warsaw Treaty, served: – to reassess the development of the international situation, particularly after the meeting at Williamsburg and the latest NATO meetings in Brussels and Paris; […] – to discuss the necessary military and political counter-measures of the Warsaw Treaty states in case of the deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Western Europe; […] 3.a) The debate about the defense measures to be taken by the Warsaw Treaty states in case of the stationing of missiles in Western Europe took a central position. Cde. Andropov […] reported, in addition to previous official Soviet statements, particularly the government declaration of May 28, 1983, that the USSR – refrains from its unilateral moratorium to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the Western part of the USSR; – also deploys wide range missiles; – is going to move Soviet tactical missiles closer to the borders of those NATO countries that deploy them. Cde. Erich Honecker […] explained the readiness of the GDR to make its territory available for stationing respective missile systems as a counter-weight to the planned [deployment of] U.S. nuclear weapons. Cde. Husák remarked for the ČSSR (whose territory would also be affected) that it would actively contribute to the necessary measures. He explicitly supported the explanation of Cde. Erich Honecker. 483 Cdes. Jaruzelski, Kádár, and Zhivkov remarked that the military superiority of the United States and NATO must not be tolerated under any circumstances. […] 4. The SRR [Socialist Republic of Romania] provided incorrect assessments and information, presenting them more arrogantly and more provocatively than earlier. The most comprehensive program of the struggle for peace is supposedly the declaration of the non-aligned New Delhi states. [Romania’s] familiar divergent assessment of the reasons for the aggravation of the international situation has been connected to the claim that the defensive measures of the Warsaw Treaty states in the case of the stationing of new U.S. missiles would accelerate the arms race, increase the risk of war, and jeopardize the existence of the European peoples. The SRR presented a series of proposals, which ran counter to the security interests of the Warsaw Treaty states, and which, on the question of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, amounted to support of the “zero or interim solution” of the United States. […] With reference to the proposals announced by Cde. Andropov, Cde. Ceaușescu demanded that the USSR not only inform the other states of the Warsaw Treaty about them, but also discuss such proposals with them in advance collectively at the highest level. In doing so, in his view, the elaboration of common positions, the consolidation of unity, cooperation, and solidarity among the fraternal countries could be served. […] Cde. Jaruzelski pointed out that the USSR was carrying the main burden of the defense of socialism and was also the shield of Poland’s security and its borders. The PPR [Polish People’s Republic] has been fulfilling its alliance commitments. At the same time, he referred to the fact that Poland suffered a direct deficit in the amount of 6 billion dollars and, in addition, an indirect deficit of almost 6 billion dollars because of the boycott policy of...

Share