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Document No. 99: Scenario of the “Soiuz-83” Exercise, June 9–August 2, 1983 ——————————————————————————————————————————— Two excerpted descriptions of the “Soiuz-83” exercise appear below. The first document , a Czechoslovak military analysis, describes how the maneuvers fit with new Soviet military plans. It explains that the exercise presumed a Western ability to launch surprise attacks in all European theaters simultaneously. This same estimate of enemy capabilities can be found in early NATO and American documents from the 1950s where 175 Soviet divisions were believed to be ready to attack almost anywhere yet still remain capable of defending the homeland. A further assumption in the document below is that the West would resort to launching over 5,000 nuclear munitions if the initial assaults failed. In the second document, a letter to Czechoslovak Defense Minister Martin Dzúr, Marshal Viktor Kulikov provides a detailed break-down of how the exercise played out. He singles out the need to destroy the West’s “intelligence and diversionary systems ,” which he describes as “qualitatively new means of warfare,” even before the onset of military action, if the Warsaw Pact forces are to have any chance of success. ____________________ a) Analysis of the exercise, June 6, 1983 The “Westerners” planned to start hostilities by surprise on June 10 in the morning , and initiate strategic operations in all European theaters simultaneously. [They decided] to organize their main assault grouping in the Central European theater. The goal of the offensive operation in the Central European theater was to destroy The “Easterners” nuclear missile grouping, ground, and naval forces on the territories of the GDR, ČSSR. and PPr and in the Baltic Sea, advance toward the borders of the USSR and sreate conditions for developing further attack. If there were a danger that the attainment of the goals of the operation by conventional means would be frustrated, the “Westerners” presumed resorting to the use of nuclear weapons (more than 5,000 nuclear munitions, about 2,800 of which during the first strike). [Source: “Rozbor operačně-strategického velitelsko-štábního cvičení … ‘Sojuz-83’” (Analysis of the Strategic Operational Staff Command Exercise … “Sojuz-83”), VS,OS, 1987, č.j. 75, 174/1, VÚA. Translated by Vojtech Mastny.] b) Letter by Marsal Kulikov to Czechoslovak Defense Minister Martin Dzúr, August 2, 1983 This exercise was carried out in accordance with the plan of joint activities of the Unified Armed Forces of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty from 30 May to 480 9 June 1983 on the territories of the GDR, Polish People’s Republic, ČSSR, and in the southern part of the Baltic sea on the subject: “The transfer of the Unified Armed Forces on the Western front from peace time to [active] military condition. The planning and conduct of the strategic operation in the theater of military operations.” […] The particular feature of the exercise was that the allied land and naval forces were brought into heightened combat readiness at the sending of a pre-determined signal through the “Monument” communications system and at the dispatch of an order from the Supreme Headquarters [of the Soviet Armed Forces] with the simultaneous subordination of the fronts (fleets) and armies to the Supreme Command of the Unified Armed Forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations. The next stage of combat readiness was achieved when, upon dispatch of appropriate signals and instructions of the Main Command of the Unified Armed forces in the Theater of Military Operations, the forces were brought into a state of combat readiness at their permanent stationing points. The transition of groupings and detachments onto the offensive from their permanent stationing points and the conduct of the air operation were carried out in real time by the “hour by hour” method. During the exercise , the methods of combating the enemy’s forward intelligence systems were extensively practiced. […] Operationalgroupsconsistingof10–12generalsandofficersheadedbythedeputies of the supreme commander and of the chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces in the course of the exercise worked on the fronts and in the armies. To work in the Staff of the Unified Armed Forces, the general staffs of the allied armies provided operational groups led by department heads of the general staffs and consisting of up to 15 people […] and 5–10 vehicles. Besides, the general staffs of the allied armies provided to the Supreme Command special communication groups consisting of 40–50 people, 17–20 special vehicles, including the “R-140...

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