Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty

Southeast Asia’s Defense Needs: Change or Continuity?

Executive Summary This chapter examines the military and security capabilities as well as the strategies of the major Southeast Asian states—Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand , the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam—and their security relations with the United States, China, Japan, India, and Australia. main argument: • The region’s security concerns are more internal than external: separatism , ethnic and religious dissidents, and the smuggling of contraband, people, and arms. • Most Southeast Asian armed forces are not purchasing state-of-the-art weapon systems but are rather developing air and naval capabilities to monitor nearby air and sea spaces. • Although Southeast Asian states are concerned about transborder terrorism , military cooperation is mostly bilateral rather than multilateral. • China is both building a naval presence in Southeast Asia and conducting diplomacy designed to reassure the region of Beijing’s intentions. • Southeast Asian states desire a continued U.S. presence to balance China. In the future they may also be willing to accept Indian and Japanese patrols designed to protect the sea lines of communication. policy implications: • By maintaining an ongoing air and naval presence in the region, the United States can both assist Southeast Asian states with external balancing vis-à-vis China and support anti-piracy and anti-terrorism efforts. • Southeast Asia’s focus on internal security fits U.S. strategy to build capabilities in the region to cope with terrorist challenges. • U.S. military assistance to facilitate more multilateral engagement will lead to such security benefits as the joint patrol of regional waters. Southeast Asia Sheldon W. Simon is Professor of Political Science and Faculty Affiliate of the Center for Asian Studies and Program in Southeast Asian Studies at Arizona State University, as well as Chairman of the Southeast Asian Studies Advisory Group and Senior Advisor to The National Bureau of Asian Research. He can be reached at . The author wishes to thank Jessica Keough, Peter Mattis, Shannon Tow, and ASU Junior Fellow Suzanne Johnson for helpful comments and research support. He also wishes to extend appreciation for the constructive criticism of two anonymous reviewers. Southeast Asia’s Defense Needs: Change or Continuity? Sheldon W. Simon The eleven states of Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma (Myanmar), East Timor, and Brunei—are small and medium players on the international stage. Strategic theorists have traditionally held that states in these categories are more sensitive to their environments than are larger, more powerful actors; Southeast Asian security policies are therefore more reactive than proactive, responding to major power policies that affect the region more than initiating actions. The other chief characteristic of Southeast Asia’s strategic situation is that these states are more concerned with internal security than external defense. Given extensive changes in the post-Cold War world order as well as the current fixation on the U.S. war on terrorism, this chapter addresses the manner in which several Southeast Asian states have attempted to reconcile security challenges that are essentially internal to the individual states—separatism, ethnic and religious unrest, and the smuggling of people and arms—with the growing presence and pressure from major external powers, particularly the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Southeast Asian states demonstrate a range of security policy preferences toward outsiders that reflect their differing interpretations about whether external actors can significantly add to local security capabilities 20 • Strategic Asia 2005–06 (as in Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand) or alternatively whether the military presence of great powers may challenge local sovereignties (as in Indonesia and Malaysia). Superimposed upon these regional political concerns is the fact that Southeast Asian states are active participants in global commerce and therefore need to ensure that the sea lines of communication (SLOC) traversing Southeast Asian waters remain free. The navies of external powers have a significant role to play in sustaining freedom of the seas. This chapter argues that a tension exists between those Southeast Asian states concerned with internal security (of which counterterrorism is only one component) and the U.S. view of Southeast Asia as a prime counterterrorism venue. Given the varied security needs of the many Southeast Asian states, there can be no single overarching explanation for defense. Rather, this chapter assesses the changing defense capabilities and needs of the major Southeast Asian states and concludes with a somewhat pessimistic evaluation of the prospects for defense collaboration. To examine the defense roles of external...