Strategic Asia 2007-08: Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy

Finding Balance: The Foreign Policiesof Central Asia’s States

executive summary This chapter studies the evolution of the foreign policies of Central Asia’s states, focusing on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. main argument: The newly independent states of Central Asia are institutionally weak and surrounded by larger regional powers. Foreign policies in the region generally aim to maintain balance among great powers and to ensure regime security. Russian and Chinese influence is strong and supportive of the latter, but the quest for balance spurs the development of ties to the U.S. and other powers. Pressure for democratization accompanies these relations with the West, which need to be treated with care by U.S. policymakers. policy implications: • Promoting security, reliable supplies of energy, and good governance are the primary U.S. interests in the region. Though widely viewed as mutually contradictory, these objectives are only achievable in the long term if pursued in concert. • Informal politics is a key element in the domestic and foreign policies of Central Asian states. Strengthening formal institutions is, therefore, a compelling priority for the U.S., as is seeking a better understanding of informal power structures. • The “color revolutions,” though beneficial to the countries that underwent them, have had negative consequences both for U.S. interests in Central Asia and for broader democratic reform. By injecting an ideological element into regional politics, these revolutions have increased Russian and Chinese influence and weakened the U.S. position. Uzbekistan stands out as the primary example. • Strategic thinking and long-term policies toward the region that inspire confidence and predictability would restore U.S. influence. Calibrating the democracy promotion agenda to the strategic realities of the region would help state-building efforts and dialogue on a wide range of issues. Central Asia Finding Balance: The Foreign Policies of Central Asia’s States Svante E. Cornell Upon independence in 1991, the five states of post-Soviet Central Asia were confronted with the entire battery of institution-building tasks normally associated with post-colonial environments. These new states found themselves in a much more challenging geopolitical position than most post-colonial states. In addition to being new and institutionally weak, the Central Asian states are relatively small and are surrounded by Eurasia’s most powerful countries. Central Asian governments have responded to this environment by seeking to strengthen their sovereignty through balancing the interests of external powers. At the same time these governments have worked to safeguard stability by controlling the pace of internal political change. State-building processes initially led Central Asia’s rulers to look inward. Over time increasingly consolidated statehood gradually enabled these states to pursue more independent foreign policies. Against the backdrop of this broader regional trend, however, diverging domestic political and economic realities have strongly affected the choices these rulers have made for their countries’ external relations. The contrasting evolutions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the region’s two most important states, are particularly noteworthy in this context. Foreign policies of the two countries have developed in nearly opposite directions, mirroring differences in their domestic development. Svante E. Cornell is Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program. He can be reached at . 268 • Strategic Asia 2007–08 In the mid-1990s Uzbekistan sought to launch itself into the role of a regional power.1 Economic stability undergirded Tashkent’s ambitions to play an independent role both by balancing Russian influence with ties to the United States and by exerting influence over smaller neighbors. This strategy intensified following September 11, 2001 when Uzbekistan seemed to achieve its aim of forging a strategic partnership with the United States. By 2005, however, Tashkent had abruptly cut ties to Washington, expelled the U.S. military base from its territory, and re-embraced Moscow’s leading role in Eurasian security affairs.2 This u-turn betrayed a reactive approach, which stemmed from a growing sense of domestic insecurity. In contrast, Kazakhstan was initially concerned with its large Russian minority and 2,000-mile border with Russia. Rapid economic liberalization accelerated the short-term economic difficulties generated by the collapse of the Soviet Union.3 The Kazakh leadership mostly kept a low profile in international issues and refrained from challenging Russia. By the mid2000s , however, the situation had changed. The infrastructure associated with the earlier economic reforms led to an oil boom. Growing domestic stability and economic growth enabled Kazakhstan to begin to formulate a distinctively independent foreign policy based on achieving balance...