No.9: The 1968 Farmington Mine Disaster

Introduction

Introduction When I came to West Virginia University in 2005, I knew nothing about coal mining. I had never seen a coal mine, and I did not know anyone who labored underground so that I could turn on my lights and run my beloved central air conditioner. Then one evening, I was in a downtown Morgantown restaurant having appetizers with Associated Press reporter Vicki Smith. We were talking about journalism, going over stories we had written or wished we could write. I told her I was looking for a good story that needed to be told. She said, had she the time, she would write about the Farmington coal mine disaster. Then she told me what happened on November 20, 1968, in a coal mine less than 30 miles from where we were sitting. That cold November morning, Consolidation Coal Company’s No.9 mine blew up, trapping 78 men underground. It continued to explode until the company sealed the mine with the men inside 10 days later. I was horrified. In 1968, I was still in high school, leading an insulated life on a rural Indiana farm. I did not remember hearing about the disaster or even seeing it on the news. I felt as though I had missed an important piece of history. I asked Vicki if I could steal her idea. She said, “Sure.” And that is how this book began. I do not pretend to be a coal mine expert, but I have learned a lot about mining over the past four years, and I can say with confidence that rarely, if ever, are coal mine disasters accidents. Historically, at least during the 2 INTRODUCTION past century, most mine disasters have been the result of poor management , inadequate regulation and enforcement, greed, negligence, carelessness , foolishness, selfishness, complacency, indifference—add your own descriptor. All too often, the drive to produce coal—to make money, to meet contracts, to satisfy stockholders—has trumped safety. When that happens, miners pay a steep price. Usually, they are killed or disabled one by one, and few people outside their own communities notice. However, every few years, a mine explodes or a roof falls and crushes or traps an entire crew, and everyone is surprised. After examining inspection records from the No.9 mine and from mines that more recently have claimed lives, I am amazed that mines do not explode more often. At this writing, the mine disaster at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch (UBB) has filled newscasts. The April 5, 2010, deaths of 29 men in Montcoal , West Virginia, were predictable. Nonunion miners who worked there have testified that the mine was dangerous. Both state and federal inspectors knew the dangers, too, judging from the hundreds of violations and fines they issued to the UBB before the disaster. Similarly, many of the miners in the Consolidation No.9 coal mine predicted their own demise long before November 20, 1968. At the Upper Big Branch, federal inspectors were in the mine at least 10 times in March 2010. They cited the company for coal dust, ventilation and roof control violations, any one of which could cause a disaster. They levied fines in the tens of thousands of dollars.1 State inspectors, too, spent at least seven days in the mine in March. They found electrical, coal dust and ventilation violations. On the morning the mine exploded, a state inspector was in the mine and cited the company for an unsupported roof and lack of ventilation in one of the working sections. He was unable, however, to complete his inspection. He came out for a break, and the mine blew up before he could go back inside.2 Immediately, the media swooped in, as they did after the No.9 exploded . Politicians began promising new laws and tougher enforcement. Government officials launched investigations. The full story of Massey Energy ’s mismanagement of the Upper Big Branch disaster has yet to unfold, but already flagrant violations have come to light. National Public Radio INTRODUCTION 3 reported that UBB managers ordered an electrician to disable methane monitors on mining machines, devices that shut a machine down if gas is building up, which a spark could explode. Safety devices routinely were disabled at the No.9 mine, too. There was too much gas and not enough air, too much coal dust and not enough rock dust, too much money to be made...