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Vincent Bissonette 137 “The most cruel misfortune”: Suffering Innocence in The Theory of Moral Sentiments Vincent Bissonette I. INTRODUCTION In The Theory of Moral Sentiments1 (TMS), Part III, Chapter 2, Adam Smithdescribesan“innocentman,broughttothescaffoldbythefalseimputation of an infamous or odious crime”. Smith does not equivocate on the significance of this situation. Such a man “suffers the most cruel misfortune which it is possible for innocence to suffer”. Smith goes on to enumerate all the feelings that will assault this man, making his demise such a dark and melancholy thing: The innocent man […] over and above the uneasiness which this fear [of death] may occasion, is tormented by his own indignation at the injustice which has been done to him. He is struck with horror at the thoughts of the infamy which the punishment may shed upon his memory, and foresees, with the most exquisite anguish, that he is hereafter to be remembered by his dearest friends and relations, not with regret and affection, but with shame, and even with horror for his supposed disgraceful conduct: and the shades of death appear to close round him with a darker and more melancholy gloom than naturally belongs to them. [TMS, III.2.11] In his discussion, Smith touches on a common philosophical topic, the problem of evil. In general, the problem of evil refers to the universal phenomenon that innocent people often suffer unjustly and how philosophical systems account for this phenomenon, explain, or mitigate it. Through this particular case, Smith suggests that his “humble philosophy”, as he calls it, might be inadequate to address the innocent man’s suffering. Religion may be a necessary palliative: To persons in such unfortunate circumstances, that humble philosophy which confines its views to this life, can afford, perhaps, but little consolation. Every thing that could render life or death respectable is taken from them. They 1 Bibliographic information for all references can be found in the Select Bibliography at the end of this essay. 138 new essays on adam smith’s moral philosophy are condemned to death and to everlasting infamy. Religion can alone afford them any effectual comfort. She alone can tell them, that it is of little importance what man may think of their conduct, while the all-seeing Judge of the world approves of it. She alone can present to them the view of another world; a world of more candour, humanity, and justice, than the present; where their innocence is in due time to be declared, and their virtue to be finally rewarded: and the same great principle which can alone strike terror into triumphant vice, affords the only effectual consolation to disgraced and insulted innocence. [TMS, III.2.12] In writing of “that humble philosophy which confines its views to this life”, Smith refers not only to his own philosophy but to an anti-speculative kind of British philosophy, forcefully articulated by his contemporary and friend David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature (THN) (1739–1740)2 and memorably captured in Alexander Pope’s couplet from his Essay on Man (1733–34): “Know then thyself, presume not God to scan; / The proper study of Mankind is Man” (516).3 In mentioning a “humble philosophy”, Smith alludes to a philosophy that anticipates a social-scientific approach to describing human interaction while eschewing the normative framework provided by religion. In this context, his recommendation of religion is clearly retrograde, a view that seems to be acknowledged in Smith’s prose. In the passage, the insights of philosophy are presented as objective description: “Every thing […] is taken from them. They are condemned […]”. In contrast, the “consolation” offered by religion is spoken by Religion herself, personified as a woman who comforts the victims. She “afford[s] them […] comfort”, “tell[s] them” that God’s judgment is more important than man’s, and “present[s] them” with a view of heaven. She gives the innocent sufferers just what they need, but that does not make it true.4 2 See especially Hume’s Introduction and Conclusion to Book I. See also John Biro, “Hume’s New Science of the Mind”, 33–36. 3 Compare Hume: “Human Nature is the only science of man; and yet has been hitherto the most neglected” (THN, 1.4.7, 273). 4 In a pragmatist vein, we might understand Smith to be recommending religion as “effectual” in certain situations where philosophy would be useless. When we try to understand the dynamics of human interaction, we use philosophical ideas. But for...

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