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BY 1978 THE IRANIAN MILITARY BUILDUP had given Muhammad Reza “the capability to patrol the sea as far south as Madagascar and the skies as far west as Cairo.”1 With his armed forces becoming even more powerful, the shah had declared a new Persian Empire. Blinded by his grand plans, he ignored numerous warning signs about the fraying of his dynasty and armed forces. The shah failed to build the bonds that ensured the historical strengths of Iranian fighting men would be used in his service. In contrast, Ayatollah Khomeini, the people’s Imam, kept a clear view of his goals and his plans for the armed forces, and it was among the various revolutionary groups that a sense of Iranian patriotism, resourcefulness, and tenacity in the face of the Pahlavi police state became most pronounced. Once Khomeini rose to be the preeminent leader of the revolution against the shah, he began to bend the Artesh and later the various armed revolutionaries to his grand design with dramatic consequences for Iran’s military force structure, roles, and effectiveness. Mounting Challenges Although the Islamic Revolution lasted little more than a year, challenges to Muhammad Reza’s rule had surged back and forth for most of the preceding decade. In the years leading up to 1978, the shah’s regime and its opponents engaged in sporadic battles fomented by a revived Tudeh Party and other leftists and, to a lesser degree, by Islamic militants. The guerrilla groups were decentralized, compartmentalized for security, and fractious. Some were financed by money from mosques, and the major groups, the Fedayeen-e Khalq and Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), received assistance from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and probably Libya. They used guerrilla warfare to provoke regime repression and show that it was possible to act against Pahlavi autocracy. Operating from Gilan’s mountains and forests, the Fedayeen-e Khalq initiated a period of intense activity with an attack on a Gendarmerie post in Siakal in February 8 Old Guard, New Guard Iran’s Armed Forces in the Islamic Revolution 212 Old Guard, New Guard 1971 that left several gendarmes and guerrillas dead. The radicals, using bank robberies to fund their activities, followed the subsequent regime crackdown with a campaign of assassinations and bombings. The MEK, which came from the religious wing of the Tudeh Party and wanted to link Shiism with modern ideas, also fought with security forces and conducted bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and attacks on American citizens. The MEK assassinated four US military officers between 1973 and 1976, killed an Iranian employee of the embassy mistaken for a US diplomat, and in August 1976 gunned down three civilian employees of Rockwell International. SAVAK was generally effective in countering guerrillas, although it took them several years to stop the violence. With four thousand full-time agents and scores of part-time informers, SAVAK cooperated with the army, Gendarmerie, and police through the Joint Anti-Terrorist Committee created in 1972 to coordinate antiguerrilla operations nationwide. The security services conducted virtually unrestrained operations against the guerrillas and surveilled government bureaucracies, censored the press, and interfered with and monitored university classes in going after the young intelligentsia, especially college students, teachers , and engineers, who manned the guerrilla groups. However, while SAVAK had dossiers on many if not most of the secular revolutionaries, it failed to penetrate their networks. The security forces also knew little about the religious opposition . Between 1971 and 1977, nearly 200 guerrillas and members of armed political groups died in gun battles while another 165 were executed, tortured to death, shot while trying to escape, or allegedly committed suicide. By early 1976, these heavy losses forced the guerrillas to reconsider their tactics and reduce violent activities. The groups remained intact, however, and added new members, kept their weapons stored, and were ready to provide muscle to the popular revolution when it began in early 1978.2 Other opposition to the shah was fragmented, demoralized, and nearly depoliticized during the early 1970s, but discontent was growing. In particular, the conspicuous consumption of the newly affluent angered the poor, while the lower and middle classes seethed over unmet expectations and the government ’s poor economic performance. Popular alienation against the throne and the perceived influence of foreign powers increased because of the shah’s emphasis on Iran’s royal heritage over its Islamic history, his ties to Israel, and the seeming subordination to US interests and Western culture. By May 1977 Iran faced a major recession, increased...

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