Bridging Troubled Waters: China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East China Sea

Conclusion: Building Maritime Order in the East China Sea

Conclusion Building Maritime Order in the East China Sea DE S P I T E P E R I O D S of severe tension, the evidence presented in this book suggests that China and Japan are quite capable of managing the tensions that arise from their contested sovereignty and jurisdiction in the East China Sea. Beijing and Tokyo have repeatedly articulated some kind of consensus on a point of difference and, however briefly, have adjusted their behavior in accord with the actual or anticipated preferences of the other party. As illustrated by the MVM, in each instance this point of consensus has addressed only one dimension of disputed space and has left the others unresolved. This reluctance to pursue deeper, binding cooperation can be explained by the different functions that each dimension of disputed space performs for state leaders. As the dispute has progressed, different aspects of disputed maritime space have become more important to the leaders of both countries. Nevertheless, grounds for optimism remain because the two sides engage in a familiar pattern of guarded crisis behavior followed by cooperative interactions on issues of discord. The sources of Sino-Japanese tensions over maritime space lie in the two parties’ shifting interpretations of their preferred status quo in the East China Sea, their reference point. This status was typically challenged by virtue of China’s emergence as a maritime power. Tacit cooperation over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—in the form of Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 modus vivendi and the post-1996 agreement not to be provoked by nationalist groups—collapsed as both parties perceived efforts by the other to alter this understanding. By contrast, challenges to the reference point galvanized cooperative action over the jurisdictional aspects of the East China Sea dispute. In 1995–96, China’s emergence as a fisheries power threatened the future of the Japanese offshore fisheries industry and exposed the challenges associated with the delimitation of the East China 1 9 9 2 0 0 C O N C L U S I O N Sea. In the years 1999–2000, China’s marine survey and military training activities heralded the beginning of a more active Chinese presence in the seas near Japan. Finally, between 2003 and 2008, China’s efforts to develop natural gas resources at the Chunxiao gas field raised concerns in Japan about ‘‘resources theft’’ and accentuated the urgency of the exercise of jurisdiction in contested maritime space. In the latter three cases, Japan pursued a cooperative strategy once the Chinese challenge created a set of circumstances that altered Japan’s interpretation of its reference point for a given jurisdictional issue in the East China Sea. In the case of fisheries and marine surveys, Japanese policy was determined by existing path dependencies until acted upon by actors outside the central policymaking apparatus. In the case of resources development , Tokyo’s reaction was driven from the center as a consequence of the centralization of Japan’s China policy under Prime Minister Koizumi and a growing awareness of the challenge that China presented in the waters around Japan. Following each Japanese ‘‘awakening,’’ Tokyo attempted to convince Beijing to alter its behavior in a fashion amenable to Japanese interests, which Beijing reciprocated. Cooperation, it seems, follows crisis. Cooperation in the East China Sea Dispute The cooperative track record between China and Japan in the East China Sea belies the expectation that the two countries are teetering on the brink of war over their disputed maritime space. Rather, there are grounds for optimism, despite the deterioration of the maritime relationship since September 2010, even as Japan loosens the restrictions on the exercise of its maritime jurisdiction. Island Sovereignty Cooperation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was achieved by establishing an informal set of circumstances under which China and Japan could pursue their wider diplomatic prerogatives. Due to the contested-symbolic sensitivity of this issue, cooperation could only ever be tacit. Deng’s modus vivendi, articulated in 1978, underwrote stability for two and a half decades. Chinese and Japanese elites frequently reminded each other of the validity of Deng’s modus vivendi during times of crisis over the disputed islands. Cooperation endured because Japanese leaders, such as Prime Minister B U I L D I N G M A R I T I M E O R D E R I N T H E E A S T C H I N A S...