-
Chapter 8: Anticipating the Effects of Terminal Logic Behavior: Avenues of Future Inquiry
- Texas A&M University Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
162 W hy do some countries succeed where others fail? Why do the budding democratic waves of some countries fall into chaos while other countries embrace the processes of modernization and the social change that comes with them? In his analysis of the global state of democracy, Diamond (2000, 418) states that “no period in world history has a wider expansion of the democratic form of government and of the ability of citizens, armed with universal suffrage, to change their political leaders in relatively free and fair elections.” Yet he adds that “if the reach of democracy is greater than ever, it is also thinner and more vulnerable.” Although this last wave of democracy has brought only three apparent democratic reversals in states of more than twenty million people (Nigeria , Sudan, and Thailand), democratic breakdowns have occurred in more than twelve states with smaller populations during the 1990s. The jury is still out on the success of the most recent revolutionary movement of unrest against autocratic governance, which began in the Arab world in late 2010. The fragility of democracy, young or old, cannot be underestimated. Certainly, there are many questions to which we do not have answers. Yet the success of democracy seems to depend greatly on the answer to one question: which set of political institutions best promises a democratic government such that a democratic state can grow and persist even in the face of poverty, ethnic and religious divisions, and traditions of authoritarian rule? The executive ofCHAPTER 8 Anticipating the Effects of Terminal Logic Behavior Avenues of Future Inquiry EFFECTS OF TERMINAL LOGIC BEHAVIOR 163 fice is one such institution whose design largely influences which way a state will swing. This book focuses on how preferences become dynamically channeled by a structure instilled by term limits. If presidents serve a set time period of four years and can be reelected to only one subsequent four-year term, I hypothesize that they operate in two distinct frames of choice and desire. Simply put, they operate in one frame whose boundaries are set by terminal logic and in another whose boundaries are not. I hypothesize that this change in the imperative for action causes a sense of urgency in completing one’s work—resulting in a rapid and otherwise unexplainable increase in policy activity. Evidence garnered in support of these hypotheses may help to explain why presidential systems, in general, face less chance of democratic achievement than do their parliamentary counterparts. I begin my analysis of terminal logic behavior with the case of the United States. I use the decree dataset to test US presidents’ rate of decree issuance over the course of their tenure with respect to domestic, foreign, and environmental policy. For each policy domain I run event count models to determine the count levels of decrees with respect to different points in presidents’ tenure. Using increased decree issuance as a proxy for TLB, the models show that TLB exists, when it is most likely to begin, and the relative degree of its effect. In particular, the models show the following: 1. Across the board in all policy domains (foreign, environmental, and domestic policy, as well as decrees of emergency power), presidents increase their rate of decree issuance when they are in the final weeks of their last term, particularly whentheirsuccessorhasbeennamedandthatsuccessorisfromtheopposingparty. 2. Presidents consider their level of legislative support when issuing decrees. The models show a systematic effect of legislative support on rates of foreign policy and emergency power decree issuance. In the foreign policy models, the effect is as expected. When the president’s party controls both houses, the result is a higher issuance rate of foreign policy decrees. This confirms previous findings that unified government may actually increase presidents’ use of decrees. The emergency power models, however, show that divided government may actually increase the rate of issuance of emergency power decrees. 3. The rates of increase in emergency power decrees and environmental policy decrees are substantial during the final ten-week period. This is surprising, particularly for the use of national emergency powers. [3.227.252.87] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 00:12 GMT) CHAPTER 8 164 4. Presidents issue decrees at significantly different rates in different policy domains. Democratic presidents are likely to issue more decrees than Republicans in domestic and environmental policy. In foreign policy and in emergency power, however, this differentiation cannot be made. 5. The rate of issuance for emergency power decrees, in general, has increased with each successive...