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​Part I The Naval Warof 1812 on theUpper Lakes Kevin J. Crisman On June 18, 1812, the Congress of the United States declared war upon Great Britain. After years of unresolved friction over freedom of trade, impressments, and western expansion, the US government gave up on diplomatic protests and embargoes and instead unleashed its army and navy. A country declaring war might be expected to marshal overwhelming forces beforehand and then strike swiftly in order to achieve some level of surprise, but the United States in 1812 was a young and not very united republic. While there was a strategic goal for the war—to punish Britain by seizing Canada—the planning and the means assembled beforehand fell far short of what was required . Throughout the first year of this conflict US leaders would display a naive and disjointed approach to waging war, and as a result, every US offensive in 1812 failed miserably.Conquest of Canada proved to be more complicated than the “mere matter of marching” that Thomas Jefferson had predicted before the war.1 Nowhere was this military incompetence more manifest than along the western border between the two belligerents, the region surrounding Lakes Erie, Huron, Michigan, and Superior (fig. I.1).The four water bodies were known collectively as the Upper Lakes because they were above Niagara Falls and Lake Ontario. Here Britain’s small but professionally led army took the initiative early and vigorously, seizing key US positions and repeatedly defeating its unprepared and ineptly led foe. In July the US fort at Mackinac Island, guardian of the straits between Lakes Huron and Michigan, fell before its commander even knew that war had been declared. In August the US Army that was supposed to invade Canada from the west instead surrendered at Detroit to a much smaller force of British and Native Americans. Other humiliating US defeats followed, until reversing the situation on the western frontier became something of an obsession for both the public and government.2 { 9 } Figure I.1. The Upper Lakes region in the War of 1812. (Map by Douglas Inglis.) { 10 } Crisman The US setbacks resulted from many errors in planning , leadership, and logistics, but the lack of a naval force on the Upper Lakes was an error of the highest order. At the start of the war the US Army had one armed transport in service, the brig Adams (14 guns), but this vessel was captured at Detroit in August. Thereafter, the British enjoyed a year of dominance on western waters; their communications, reinforcements , and supplies moved rapidly and safely from point to point, and British commanders could concentrate their troops to attack where and when they chose. The Upper Lakes presented the most extensive and in many ways the most challenging arena for the inland navies of the War of 1812. Even discounting Lakes Michigan and Superior (which would remain on the periphery of the naval contest), the range of navigable waters far exceeded Lakes Ontario and Champlain to the east. Erie, the southernmost Great Lake, extends over a distance of 241 miles (388 km) with a maximum breadth of 57 miles (92 km), while Huron, to the north, the second largest Great Lake, is 206 miles (332 km) in length and up to 152 miles (245 km) in width. Together the two lakes offered countless natural hazards and difficult passages; the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers connecting Huron to Erie were particularly tricky for deep-­ drafted sailing ships. Fast-­ changing weather and harborless lee shores made navigation dangerous throughout the year. It was no place for faint-­ hearted mariners. British naval forces on Lakes Erie and Huron at first consisted of only two modestly sized vessels, the recently completed ship Queen Charlotte (16 guns) and the small, older schooner General Hunter (6 guns). These were rapidly augmented by vessels built, captured , or hired into service, including the newly launched schooner Lady Prevost (10 guns), the brig Detroit (previously the US Adams), and eight or nine merchant vessels of varying rigs and tonnage (the largest was the 120-­ ton Northwest Company schooner Nancy). In 1812 the armed vessels carried fewer guns than they were capable of mounting since the absence of opposition made it unnecessary to crowd their decks with cannon (fig. I.2).3 All British government vessels on North American lakes operated under the purview of the Provincial Marine, a supply and transport service managed by the Quartermaster General’s Department of the British Army. Charged...

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