The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy: In Two Volumes

Introduction

47 The Principles of Moral Philosophy u part i u Introduction Every one who knows what natural philosophy is, or how it proceeds in its enquiries will easily conceive what moral philosophy must mean; and how it likewise ought to be pursued: for all enquiries into fact, reality, or any part of nature must be set about, and carried on in the same way; and an enquiry into human nature is as much an enquiry into fact, as any question about the frame and texture (for instance) of any plant, or of the human body. The objects of science are justly divided into corporeal, or sensible ones; and those which not being perceived by the outward senses, but by re- flexion on the mind itself and its inward operations, are therefore called intellectual or moral objects. Hence the consideration of the former is stiled Physiology, or Natural philosophy; and that of the other is called Rational, or Moral philosophy. Buthoweverphilosophymaybedivided; nothing can be more evident, than, that the study of nature, whether in the constitution and oeconomy of the sensible world, or in the frame and government of the moral, must set out from the same first principles , and be carried on in the same method of investigation, induction, and reasoning; since both are enquiries into facts or real constitutions. What is natural philosophy, how is it defined? or, how are its researches carried on? By it is understood an enquiry into the sensible world: that is “into the general laws, according to which its appearances are produced ; and into the beauty, order, and good which these general laws Natural philosophy distinguish ’d from moral. But both are enquiries into fact or nature. Natural philosophy described. 48 part i produce.” And therefore in such an enquiry the following maxims are justly laid down as the foundations on which all its reasonings are built; or as the first principles from which all its conclusions are inferred; and without supposing which it cannot proceed one step. I. That if the corporeal world be not governed by general laws, it cannot be the object of enquiry or science; and far less of imitation byarts,since imitation necessarily presupposes knowledge of the object imitated;and science presupposes a certain determinate object; or fixed ascertainable relations and connexions of things. Upon the contrary supposition the corporeal world must be absolutely unintelligible. Nature, in order to be understood by us, must always speak the same language to us: it must therefore steadily observe the same general laws in its operations, orworkuniformlyandaccordingtostated,invariablemethodsandrules. Those terms, order, beauty, general good, and a whole, which are too familiar to philosophers, to need any definition, or explication, plainly include in their meaning, analogy and constancy; uniformity amidst variety ; or in other words, the regular observance of general, settled laws in the make and oeconomy, production and operations, or effects of any object to which they are ascribed. Wherever order, fixed connexions, or general laws and unity of design take place, there is certainty in the nature of such objects; and so far therefore knowledge may be acquired. But where these do not obtain, there can be nothing but unconnected independent parts; allmustbeconfusionanddisorder;andconsequently such a loose disjointed heap of things must be an inexplicable chaos. In one word, science, prudence, government,imitation,andart,necessarily suppose the prevalence of general laws throughout all the objects in nature to which they reach. No being can know itself, project or pursue any scheme, or lay down any maxims for its conduct; but so far as its own constitution is certain; and the connexion of things relative to it are fixed and constant; for so far only, are things ascertainable;andtherefore so far only, can rules be drawn from them. “Nature’sa operating according to general laws (says a very ingenious a. Principles of human knowledge. [George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710, 1734). The quote is based mainly on A.151.] The principles it presupposes and proceeds upon in its enquiries. First principle. introduction to part i 49 philosopher) is so necessary for letting us into the secret of nature, and for our guidance in the affairs of life, that without it, all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity could serve to no manner of purpose : it were even impossible thereshouldbeanysuchfacultiesorpowers in the mind. It is this alone, gives us that foresight which...