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ix introduction Liberty and Happiness The political dimension of liberty is at least twofold: civil liberties and independence. The former is a matter of the political order of acountry; the latter, of freedom from foreign domination. Liberty and happiness can be related to each other as they were in the third section of the “Virginia Bill of Rights,” from 6 June 1776: That government is or ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; of all the various modes and forms of government, that is best which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety and is most effectually secured against the danger of maladministration; and that when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community has an indubitable, inalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal. The preceding section puts forward a short argument: The right to reform, alter, or abolish government is founded on the judgment of whether such government is adequate or contrary to its main purpose, namely the greatest degree of happiness and safety of the community. The argument has a philosophical background. The criterion of “producing the greatest degree of happiness” is part of the principal maxim of utilitarian ethics. The right of resistance against inadequate government , on the other hand, is part of the liberal creed. In the eighteenth century the Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), in his Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (London, x introduction 1725), linked the two sides of the argument for the first time.1 There he even coined the phrase, “That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers.”2 Hutcheson’s philosophy became part of the ideas that formed the American polity. In the eighteenth century his books were imported to America and his philosophy was well known through his students and learned visitors to Scotland—among them was Benjamin Franklin in 1759. Hutcheson’s ideas even became part of the colonial curriculum.3 The Inquiry, which is published here in a new edition, was the book that established Hutcheson’s reputation as a philosopher. The Argument of the Inquiry Already in this early work, Hutcheson detailed some of his political ideas.4 However, his main task was examining the foundations of his aesthetic, moral, and political philosophy.Thiswasdoneintwotreatises, one dealing with the principles of aesthetics,5 the other with those of ethics and, to some extent, their politicalconsequences.6 Inbothtreatises 1. For Hutcheson’s biography, see W. R. Scott, Francis Hutcheson, His Life, Teaching and Position in the Historyof Philosophy (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1900; reprint, New York: A. M. Kelley, 1966). Also see the brief overview of Hutcheson ’s early life and writings in the editor’s introduction to Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728), ed. Aaron Garrett (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003). 2. The formula was first used by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in a critical remark on Samuel Cocceji’s thesis De Principio Juris Naturalis Unico, Vero, et Adaequato (Frankfurt: Schrey/Hartmann, 1699); see Joachim Hruschka, pp. 166–69. 3. For the impact of Hutcheson’s philosophy in Europe and America, see the introduction to Hutcheson, Über den Ursprung unserer Ideen vonSchönheitundTugend, ed. Wolfgang Leidhold (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), pp. xi–xiv. 4. Especially in the second and the third editions of the Inquiry, 1726 and 1729, respectively. 5. On Hutcheson’s aesthetic philosophy, see the works and articles of Peter Kivy, Caroline Korsmeyer, E. Michael, and M. Strasser, listed in “References and Further Reading” (p. xix of this volume). 6. For discussion of Hutcheson’s central ideas, see “References andFurtherReading ” (p. xix of this volume), especially the works and articles of Giovanni de Crescenzo , William K. Frankena, Knud Haakonssen, Peter Kivy, Wolfgang Leidhold, David Fate Norton, D. D. Raphael, Jane Rendall, and William Robert Scott; still [18.218.38.125] Project MUSE (2024-04-24 04:23 GMT) introduction xi the structure of the argument is similar: (1) Our ideas have their origin in our perceptions and are received by senses. (2) For different perceptions we have different senses. (3) Perceptions are founded in certain qualities of the objects perceived. (4) These qualities we can describe in a maxim or formula. Hutcheson’s theory in both...

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