An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue

Section I. Of the moral Sense by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve, or disapprove them in others

89 u s e c t i o n i u Of the Moral Sense by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve or disapprove them in others. I. That the Perceptions of moral Good and Evil, are perfectly different from those of natural Good, or Advantage, every one must convince himself, by reflecting upon the different Manner in which he finds himself affected when these Objectsoccurto him.HadwenoSenseof Good distinct from the Advantage or Interest arising from the external Senses, and the Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony; 㛳1 our Admiration and Love㛳 toward a fruitful Field, or commodious Habitation, would be much the same with what we have toward a generous Friend, or any noble Character; for both are, or may be advantageous to us: And we should no moreadmire any Action,orloveanyPersoninadistantCountry , or Age, whose Influence could not extend to us, than we love the Mountains of Peru, while we are unconcern’d in the Spanish Trade. We should have the same Sentiments and Affections [118] toward inanimate Beings, which we have toward rational Agents; which yet every one knows to be false. Upon Comparison, we say, “Why should we㛳2 admire or love with Esteem㛳 inanimate Beings? They have no Intention of Good to 㛳3 us㛳; their Nature makes them fit for our Uses, which they neither know nor study to serve. But it is not so with rational Agents: 㛳4 they study our Interest, and delight in our Happiness, and are Benevolent toward us.㛳” We are all then conscious of the Difference between that 㛳5 Love and Esteem㛳, or Perception of moral Excellence, which Benevolenceexcites Different Ideas of Moral and Natural Good. 90 treatise ii toward the Person in whom we observe it, and that Opinion of natural Goodness, which only raises Desire of Possession toward the good Object . Now “what should make this Difference, if all Approbation, or Sense of Good be from Prospect of Advantage? Do not inanimate Objects promoteour Advantage,aswellasBenevolentPersonswhodo㛳6 us㛳 Offices of Kindness, and Friendship? Should we not then have the same endearing 㛳7 Sentiments㛳 of both? or only the same cold Opinion of Advantage in both?” The Reason why it is not so, must be this, “That we have a distinct Perception of Beauty, or Excellence in the kind Affec- [119]tions of rational Agents; whence we are determin’d to admire and love such Characters and Persons.” Supposewe reap the sameAdvantagefromtwoMen,oneof 㛳8 whom㛳 serves us 㛳9 from Delight in our Happiness, and Love toward us;㛳 the other from Views of Self-Interest, or by Constraint: both are in thisCase equally beneficial or advantageous to us, and yet we shall have quite different Sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other Perceptions of moral Actions than those of Advantage: And that Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call’d a Moral Sense, since the Definition agrees to it, viz. a Determination of the Mind, to receiveanyIdea from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us, 㛳10 independent㛳on our Will.㛳11 *㛳 This perhaps will be equally evident from our Ideas of Evil, done to us designedly by a rational Agent. Our Senses of natural Good and Evil would make us receive, with equal Serenity and Composure, an Assault, a Buffet, an Affront from a Neighbour, a Cheat from a Partner, or Trustee, as we would an equal Damage from the Fall of a Beam, 㛳12 a㛳 Tile, or a Tempest; and we should have the same Affections and Sentiments 㛳13 of both㛳. Villany, Treachery, [120] Cruelty,wouldbeasmeekly resented as a Blast, or Mildew, or an overflowing Stream. But I fancy every one is very differently affected on these Occasions, tho there may be equal natural Evil in both. Nay, Actions no way detrimental, may occasion the strongest Anger, and Indignation, if they evidenceonlyimpotent Hatred, or Contempt. And, on the other hand, the Intervention * See the Preface, Page 6. In Actions done to our selves. Of Evil, Moral and Natural. section i 91 of moral Ideas may prevent our 㛳14 Hatred㛳 of the Agent, or bad moral Apprehension of that Action, which causes to us the greatest natural Evil. Thus the Opinion of Justice in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideas of moral Evil in the Execution, or Hatred toward the Magistrate, who is the immediate Cause of our greatest Sufferings. II. In our Sentiments of Actions 㛳15 which affect㛳 our selves, there...