A Treatise of the Laws of Nature

The Introduction

247 the introduction§I. It concerns us both, friendly Reader, “That you should be briefly acquainted with the Design and Method of this Treatise”; for thence you will immedately perceive, “What I have perform’d, or, at least, attempted ; and what is further to be supply’d from your ownUnderstanding , or the Writings of others.” The Laws of Nature are the Foundations of all moral and civil Knowledge, as in the following Work will at large appear. But these, as all other Conclusions, discoverable by the Light of Nature, may be deduc’d two ways; either from those manifest Effects which flow from them, or from the Causes whence they themselvesarise. I have endeavour’d to discover them in this latter Method, by arguing from the Cause to the Effect. To the former Method of proving their Obligation , (by arguing from the Effect to the Cause,) belongs what has been written by Hugo Grotius, and by his Brother, in his Posthumous Work, and by our Countryman Sharrock, who establishthemfromtheapprov’d Sentiments of various Authors of differentNationsandAges,asalsofrom a Harmony in the Manners and Laws, if not of all, at least of the politer, Nations.1 Hitherto also is to be referr’d that Work of Selden’s,concerning the Laws of Nature and Nations, according to the Sentiments of the Hebrews .2 And, in my Opinion, all these Authors have deserv’d well of Mankind. But especially the Work of Hugo Grotius, which was the first of the kind, I think worthy, both of the Author, and of Immortality. For a few Slips, and those in Matters, inwhichthe Customsof hisCoun1 . Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625); Grotius, De Principis Juris Naturalis Enchiridion (1667); Sharrock, De Officiis Secundum Naturae Jus (1660). 2. Selden, De Jure Naturali et Gentium (1640). The Design of this Treatise. Two ways of deducing the Laws of Nature. 1. From their Effects. This insisted on by Grotius, Sharrock, &c. 248 introduction try seem to have biass’d that great Man, will easily obtain Pardon from a candid Reader.§II. Nor, truly, are the Objections, which are usually brought against this method of proving the Laws of Nature, (by arguing from the Effect to the Cause, as Grotius does,) of so great weight, as to prove it altogether fallacious and useless; altho I readily acknowledge, that they may so far prevailwithcandidInquirersafterTruth ,astoconvincethem,Thatitwould be more useful and safe, to find out a fuller Proof, by searching into the Causes, which produce in the Mind of Man the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature. This, however, will more plainly appear, if we brieflypropose those Objections, with the Answers to them. In the first place it is objected, “That the Induction is weak, which infers, from the Writings or Manners of a few Men, or Nations, the Opinion or Judgment of all.” Now there is scarce any Person so well acquainted with the Laws and Customs of any one State, that can ever have a perfect Knowledge of them all; much less that can attain to such a Knowledge of the Laws of all States, still less, of theinwardSentiments of each Individual, as may enable him, upon a just Comparison, to conclude , what those Notions are, in which all agree. To this it is answer’d, “That the Judgments made by differentNations concerning matters of daily publickPractice,(suchareReligion,orsome sort of divine Worship in general, and a degree of Humanity, sufficient to prohibit Murder, Theft, and Adultery,) may with ease be every where observ’d by any Man, without so profound a Knowledge of theirLaws”: and such Judgments sufficiently declare that they agree in the Laws of Nature ; for that which we know by Experience, to be, as it were, naturally acknowledg’d good by many Nations, we presume, upon account of the likeness of human Nature, to be likewise acknowledg’d good by the rest; especially when our Adversaries cannot produce one undoubted Instance, to prove any Nation to be of different Sentiments. To me, truly, those Narratives of some few barbarous Americans, and the Hottentots, “That they have no religious Worship,” seem, not suspected only but, false; for such a negative Assertion is hardly capable of ever being prov’d by TesUseful , tho objected against. First Objection from insufficient Induction . introduction 249 timony. Therefore Acosta3 and some others seem rashly to have form’d a Judgment concerning those, with whose...