A Call to Conscience: The Anti-Contra War Campaign

5. Organizational Dynamics of a Decentralized Campaign

[ 114 ] CHAPTER 5 Organizational Dynamics of a Decentralized Campaign Unlike the anti–Vietnam War movement, in which activist groups argued for years over whether to demand immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops or a negotiated settlement, there were no division in the anti–Contra War campaign over immediate political goals. Participating groups were united in seeking an immediate end to U.S. support for the contras, opposing a direct U.S. invasion of Nicaragua and, after May 1985, calling for an end to the U.S. trade embargo. These common political goals did much to mitigate differences in philosophies, organizing styles, tactical preferences, and constituencies . Although there was no central leadership body comparable to the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Clearinghouse in St. Louis, the ACWC and Central America movement developed a number of cooperative venues that served to align organizational strategies and activities: annual Central America weeks; lobbying and legislative strategy coordinated by the Central America Working Group (CAWG); nationally coordinated demonstrations (November 1983, April 1985, October 1986, and April 1987); a movement presence at the Democratic Party convention in 1984 via the Central America Peace Campaign (CAPC); a nationwide protest network via the Pledge of Resistance (POR); a United States–Nicaragua sister city movement facilitated by the Wisconsin Coordinating Council on Nicaragua (WCCN); and a common humanitarian aid shipment system developed by the Quixote Center. Organizational Dynamics of a Decentralized Campaign [ 115 ] Whether the sum of these projects added up to a well-coordinated campaign is a matter of debate. David Reed, who followed Richard Healey as director of the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy (CNFMP), described the anti-intervention movement in 1986 as “for the most part, reactive, unable to anticipate and prepare for coming events.” He bemoaned “the absence of a clear division of labor among the many groups in the anti-intervention movement” and an organizational tendency toward “turf protection.”1 The scholar-activist William M. LeoGrande was more sanguine about the Central America movement . “You had a degree of division of labor” and the “coordination of groups was quite good,” he said. The fact that there were so many different groups was “appropriate as different constituencies were reached. To force everyone into one mold was unnecessary.”2 The historian-activist Van Gosse also found much to admire in the Central America movement, describing it as “a movement of bewildering diversity, an oddly workable cacophony of individual and institutionalhistories ,andhighlydevelopedorganizationalpractices.”Yethealsonoted an excessive degree of “local autonomy” within the movement and a self-defeating tendency among some groups to “attack leadership whenever possible.” “What is missing,” he wrote, “is some central leadership” that could coordinate “sustained campaigns of public education and action.”3 Virtually all activists recognized the need for some degree of national coordination of activities for reasons of both efficiency and effectiveness. It was hardly worthwhileforonenationalgrouptocallforanational“dayofaction”withoutthe support of other organizations and related publicity. To be considered a credible movement in the press as well as to generate enthusiasm within the movement, sizable numbers of people were needed at events and demonstrations. Similarly, the more agreement on a common set of educational themes to promote, the more likely these themes would be amplified in the media and influence the public discourse. Yet there was also a strong desire among activists to maintain their separate organizations, as each had its own range of issues, base of supporters, cultural identity, and philosophical perspective. The loose construction of the ACWC allowed diverse groups to maintain their autonomy and cooperate where theysawfit,avoidingschisms.Leftistandpacifistgroupscouldespousetheirradical critiques of U.S. foreign policy; liberal groups could maintain their political focus and respectable image; and religious groups could retain their faith-based identity, embodied in prayers, sermons, rituals, symbols, and language. Decentralization did not resolve differences between groups, but it generally kept conflicts within bounds. One small conflict occurred at the third United [ 116 ] CHAPTER 5 States–Nicaragua Sister Cities Conference in Managua in June 1988. As recalled by Sheldon Rampton of WCCN, a leftist solidarity activist from the West Coast got up during a workshop and denounced a WCCN brochure for emphasizing solidarity with the Nicaraguan people (the word “people” was underlined) rather than with the FSLN. “You know,” said Rampton, “it was very much a Nicaragua Network type of line—support for the Sandinistas was a principle in and of itself.” The moment passed without further ado, but Rampton came away from the meeting feeling...