In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

appendix: the uses of a source As one might expect in a project that depended on U.S. and GVN funding and logistical support, Rand Corporation interviews in My Tho often took the form of an intelligence-gathering operation. Rand staffers probed for information on the routines, campsites, and leadership structures of guerrilla units; tried to learn more about NLF reaction to different weapons, battle- field tactics, and pacification campaigns; and kept track of the names, whereabouts , and activities of local Front militants. In hopes of encouraging defections , they sought information on what the rural population thought of propaganda leaflets, how they reacted to loudspeaker broadcasts from helicopters , whether they listened to Saigon radio, and what considerations were most likely to prompt a “rally” to the government side.1 Rand also made a critical choice at the beginning of the motivation and morale project, one that launched it in a promising direction. At a time when others in the U.S.-GVN orbit showed no interest in the opinions and experiences of the Vietnamese peasantry, DT series interviewers gave the floor to country people and questioned them at length about their backgrounds, experiences , and opinions in the midst of revolution and war. In their turn these previously unheard subjects tried to steer the interviews in directions of their own choosing. In hopes of protecting themselves in an inhospitable environment, they sometimes responded with lies and evasions, flattery, and expressions of contrition verging on the abject. But most were manifestly fighting to hold on to their dignity, and in the end, their voices come through with a startling force. a power-laden context The forty-two prisoners questioned by Rand could not be counted on to speak truthfully. Some provided misleading answers in order to protect still active comrades, while others were primarily concerned to deny or minimize their participation in the revolution. According to one interviewer, a number of POWs “gave false information to the interrogators to prevent the GVN from exploiting them effectively for information and to reduce their jail term.” Rand staffer Phillips Davison notes that “many prisoners had been mishandled or even tortured during earlier interrogation sessions.” Prisoner-informants must have hesitated to speak of such incidents to Rand staffers allied with the people who had mistreated them, but even so, eleven of the forty-two reported that 226 appendix they had been tortured. Interviewee no. 144 was questioned by Rand “in a small room with ARVN interrogators milling around and listening in on the interview, so that the subject had to be guarded about what he said.” Interviewee no. 57 was “sometimes frank and sometimes reserved depending on the presence or absence of police officers in the interview room.” Interviewee no. 81 “was not sincere in his answers, perhaps because he still suspected and was afraid that his answers would influence his forthcoming trial by the Military Court.”2 Prisoner narratives feature implausible accidents and more than a little special pleading. Several informants claimed to have quit or been purged from the Front or to have deserted from the PLAF weeks or months before being apprehended and insisted that they should be treated as simple citizens and not enemy combatants. Others professed to welcome capture because they were disillusioned with the movement. Still others were familiar with GVN catechisms. A man who had been incarcerated under the Diem regime offered the following report: I found that the study sessions in the prison had nothing interesting, therefore I later resumed my work for the NLF. In the study sessions in prison, I was taught of the differences between nationalism and communism . When we discussed our subject matter in order to be able to understand the reasons for this, the instructors did not allow us to freely express our ideas. Anyone who said something to defend his ideas would be considered as having been influenced by Communism. Consequently, he could be handcuffed or put into a cell. Therefore, the inmates only studied for the sake of study. They unanimously agreed to the ideas of the instructors so that they could be released early. This prisoner and others could be pardoned for anticipating that the same sort of dynamic would apply in the Rand interviews. With no reason to assume the good faith of their “instructors,” and hoping to be “released early,” they must have been tempted to say what they thought researchers wanted to hear.3 Although their situation was not as bleak...

Share