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122 herman hattaway and archer jones Lincoln as Military Strategist Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones The thesis of this paper is that Abraham Lincoln was a conventional midnineteenth -century military strategist who fully shared the ideas of Henry W. Halleck, George B. McClellan, and his otherWest Point–trained generals.These generals, like von Moltke in Prussia, analyzed operations in terms of lines of operations, believed in the superiority of the defensive over the offensive, and saw in turning movements the only way to overcome the power of the riflestrengthened defensive. Lincoln derived his ideas primarily from his generals and from militaryrealities as exhibited in thecourse of thewar. it is not material to the thesis whether or not the generals derived their ideas from Jomini and whether or not Jomini was an exponent of napoleonic or eighteenth-century Austrian strategy. itis significantthatLincoln’s ideaswere realistic andworkable. The president was early indoctrinated by McClellan with the concept of the powerof the defensewhen, in January1862, theGeneral-in-Chief explained that the “history of every formerwar” had “conclusively shown the great advantages which are possessed by an army acting on the defensive and occupying strong positions.” McClellan had found at the beginning of the war that “but few civilians in our country, and indeed not all military men of rank, had a just appreciation of that fact.”if “veteran troops frequentlyfalterand are repulsed with loss,” then “new levies . . . cannot be expected to advance without cover” against 122 E Civil War History, vol. XXvi no. 4, © 1980 by The kent State university Press In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option. Job Name: -- /358884t lincoln as military strategist 123 1. McClellan to Stanton, Feb. 3, 1862, The War of the rebellion: A Compilation of the Official records of the Union andConfederateArmies (Washington, 1880–1901), v, 42–45 (all references are to Series i unless otherwise noted; these Official records will hereinafter be cited as Or) and roy P. Basler, (ed.), Collected Works ofAbraham Lincoln (new Brunswick, n.J.,1953–1955), v, 120–25 (reproduced here in part, including portions omitted in theOfficial records); Lincoln to McClellan, Feb. 3, 1862, Or, v, 41–42;President’s Special War order no. 1, Jan. 31, 1862, ibid., 41; McClellan to Lincoln, Aug. 4, 1861, ibid., 6–9;McClellan toW. Scott, Apr. 27, 1861, ibid., Li, part 1, 338–39; Scott to Lincoln, May 2, 1861, ibid., 339; Scott to McClellan, May 3, 1861, ibid.,369–70;McClellan ’s report to L. Thomas, Aug. 4, 1863, ibid., v, 54; J. Shields to McClellan, Jan. 10, 1862, ibid., 700–702; J. G. Barnard to Jos. Totten, Dec. 10, 1861, ibid., 683. For Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke’s comparable analysis of tactical power of the defense and his similar reliance on turning movements in 1870, see Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (new York, 1961), 7. 2. Lincoln toAgenor-etienne deGasparin,Aug. 4, 1862, Basler, Collected Works,v, 355;Lincoln to John A. Dix, June 30, 1862, ibid., 194; Lincoln to McClellan, Apr. 9, May 24, 25, 1862, ibid., 184–85, 232, 236. See also Lincoln to Halleck, May 24, 1862, ibid., 231; Lincoln to McDowell, May 30, 1862, ibid., 252. the “murderous fire” of intrenched defenders. He would solve this problem by turning the enemy, for “the effect of this movement” to the enemy’s rear “will be to reverse the advantages of position. They will have to seek us in our own works, as we sought them at Manassas.” The strength of the defense meant that offensive battles against an enemywith his back to his communications implied a victory which “produces no final results, & may require years of warfare & expenditure to follow up.”1 With the aid of McClellan and other generals, Lincoln early became fully at home with his generals’ military conceptions. To the question as to why “the north with her great armies” so often faced the South in battle “with inferiority of numbers,” the President explained “that the enemy hold the interior, and we the exterior lines.” Along with understanding lines of operations he fully grasped the logistics of field armies and the significance of intrenchments and had learned to attach great importance to the turning movementorto anychance “to get in the enemies’ rear” or to “intercept the enemies’ retreat.”2 The military sophistication which the President had acquired...

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