The Battle of Lake Erie and Its Aftermath: A Reassessment

Invading Canada: Joint Operations Across Lake Erie

62 military operations Invading Canada Joint Operations Across Lake Erie David Curtis Skaggs On 10 September the sound of guns echoed across Lake Erie, the rumble heard from Detroit to Cleveland. But the outcome of the long-expected naval engagement was unknown to those on shore. The next day General William Henry Harrison ordered his troops garrisoned at Camp Seneca (modern Old Fort, Ohio) to march to Lower Sandusky, even though nooneknewtheresultofthenavalengagement.Butbeforethearrivingtroops had time to pitch their tents, a boat came up the river “with all the speed oars could give her.” Shortly after the officer commanding the vessel reached Harrison ’sheadquartersatFortStephenson,thetroops“heardatremendousshout and hurrahing, and then the booming of cannon. All eyes were turned in that direction, knowing that something glorious had occurred, what, we could not guess.” Soon, recalled Supply Sergeant Alfred Brunson, a man came “running downthehillatabreak-neckspeed”andannouncedtotheanxioussoldiersthe news of the American victory on the lake. There ensued a universal shout and rejoicing. Everyone knew the consequences of the destruction of the British squadron on the lake—the invasion of Canada was about to begin.1 The 1813 invasion of Canada by General Harrison’s North West Army with the assistance of Perry’s squadron constitutes the most immediate consequence of the Battle of Lake Erie. TheneedtoinvadeCanadawastheendresultofAmericanmilitarydefeats, miscues, surrenders, and leadership incompetence in 1812. The most serious of these mistakes in the western theater was the surrender of Detroit. General Isaac Brock of Upper Canada (modern Ontario) exploited British control of Lake Erie to transfer troops from the Niagara frontier to Fort Malden on the Canadian side of the Detroit River. American brigadier general William Hull – 62 – joint operations across lake erie 63 allowed Brock’s troops to land on the Michigan shore without opposition. Using the threat of an Indian massacre if the Americans resisted, which had been used elsewhere by the British, Brock demanded the capitulation of the territorial capital. Hull surrendered on 16 August without firing a shot.2 In his earliest 1812 planning, Harrison never sought naval assets in the quest for military dominance of the Old Northwest. In the summer and fall of 1812 he concentrated on the retaking of Detroit without any naval assistance ; this was predicated on the obvious conclusion that there was no way an American naval force could be constructed, armed, and manned before the end of the shipping season. Only gradually did he envision the necessity of naval superiority on Lake Erie as a requirement for the reconquest of Detroit . His first intimation of any Navy Department effort on the Great Lakes came in a letter from Secretary of War William Eustis dated 1 September.3 Meanwhile, Harrison’s close ally, Governor Isaac Shelby of Kentucky, concluded that to try to retake Detroit without taking Fort Malden first was the wrong course. In a letter to the new secretary of war, John Armstrong, the governor advised that “a decisive step” be employed to “secure the superior command of Lake Eire, which being effected would prevent the Enemy from reinforcing his troops in that quarter & the forwarding of supplies for their use.” At the same time, American use of waterborne transport would dramatically cut transportation costs by reducing the need for wagons and Perry’s message. Reprinted from Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812 (New York: Harper Brothers, 1869). 64 military operations their drivers, artillery horses, pack horses, pack horse masters and their drivers , and the necessary forage to support them.4 By early 1813 it had become apparent to those in Washington that the accomplishment of the objective of retaking and holding Detroit and of subduing hostile Native Americans within the United States necessitated two missions be achieved: first, secure naval dominance of Lake Erie, which would isolate the British and Indians on the Detroit River from sources of supply and reinforcements; and second, conduct a military campaign from the Ohio Valley into southern Michigan and what is now southwestern Ontario that would destroy the British-Indian alliance and the British Army in the region. To accomplish the latter, the United States committed itself to a cross-lake amphibious operation involving both army and navy forces cooperating toward a common objective. To achieve optimum results in joint army-navy operations, the American military currently seeks unity of command, whereby an officer from one service commands all military forces in a particular region. But an organizational arrangement that has...