NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts

6 The Multilateral Force as an Instrument for a European Nuclear Force?

91 The Atlantic Alliance as a Partnership of Equals At the end of the 1950s, the European allies began to question the effectiveness of the American nuclear guarantee. The successful launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite in 1957 fueled European fears of abandonment by the United States as it made U.S. territory vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack, and discussion of Atlantic policy intensified within the U.S. government. RobertBowieaddressedpolitical,economic,andmilitaryaspectsofU.S.relations with Europe in a 1960 report on long-term planning. He recommended different kinds of actions in each field, the best known of which is his proposal for the creation of a seaborne multilateral force (MLF). At the same time, Bowie argued that the nature of the relationship was in transition as the Europeans had regained their economic strength and aspired to a role reflecting that strength. “A Europe able to act as an effective entity would deserve and could exercise comparable influence on common policy and action. Disposing resources much nearer to those of the US, such a Europe could join in the genuine partnership of equals.”1 The idea of an Atlantic community as a partnership of equals assumed new significance when the Kennedy administration made it one of the key elements of its foreign policy. PresidentKennedystatedinJuly1962thattheUnited Stateswasprepared “todiscuss with a united Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership , a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union founded here 175 years ago.”2 Kennedy’s views were very much in sympathy with those expressed in Europe by Jean Monnet.3 This should come as no surprise to those who are acquainted 6 The Multilateral Force as an Instrument for a European Nuclear Force? Ine Megens 92 Nato and the warsaw pact with the intimate relationship between Monnet and some officials in the then new administration, notably George Ball. Jean Monnet was the founder of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, which promoted European integration4 and was made up of individuals from political parties and trade unions in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. During its annual session, the Action Committee adopted resolutions, presented positions on current issues, outlined specific principles, and formulated demands for further integration. The June 1962 declaration is the first one to mention the idea of a partnership of equals between Europe and the United States,5 stating that the current relationship should be gradually transformed into a partnership between a united Europe and the United States. François Duchêne, one of Monnet’s closest associates, has argued that for Monnet the principle of an Atlantic partnership was both an attempt to prevent a split between European countries and a license to develop the community in cohabitation with the United States.6 Accordingly, the establishment of a political union, a United States of Europe, was a prerequisite if Europe was to be on equal terms with the United States of America. British accession to the European Economic Community rather than a political union was the first priority for Europeanists on both sides of the Atlantic in the early 1960s. Although the prospects of Britain joining the community fluctuated, Charles de Gaulle’s veto on British entry in January 1963 seems nonetheless to have taken many by surprise. The French veto came in the wake of the Nassau conference where President John F. Kennedy had offered Polaris missiles to British prime minister Harold Macmillan. The United States tendered the same missiles to France on equivalent conditions, but de Gaulle declined the offer. This was yet another instance of French and American policies clashing on nuclear weapons. The Franco-German treaty of the same month worsened the situation and created a tense atmosphere between the Atlantic partners. De Gaulle’s veto added urgency to the negotiations about the trade expansion act, while the proposal for a MLF took on new importance in the military field. The MLF as a Panacea for All Problems It was Bowie who first put forward a plan for a seaborne MLF to be assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. In his view, both sea basing and mixed manning were essential features, designed to ensure joint control, prevent the national withdrawal of units, and reduce vulnerability of the force. A proposed first step called for the United States to commit Polaris atomic missile submarines to the Atlantic alliance.7 Outgoing secretary of state Christian Herter had presented this proposal...