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CHAPTER 1 Spying and Terrorism The Geneva Convention required a war prisoner to give his name, rank, and number, nothing more. Any belligerent needs more information than that. American authorities had to extract information from their unwilling “guests” while maintaining the strictest secrecy for fear of reprisals against its own soldiers. Those “guests,” of course, resisted when they could, driven by motives of natural patriotism and bitter resentment against the tricks of enemy interrogators. if secrecy posed a problem, so did the fact that the two American interrogation centers were bureaucratic hybrids shared by Army and Naval intelligence (G-2 and oNi), which finished plans for them shortly after Pearl Harbor . one of them was located at Fort Hunt, Virginia, a wooded eighty-acre tract twenty miles south of Washington. This former spanish War fortress, World War i command post, and Civilian Conservation Corps camp began receiving “guests” in August 1942. The second camp, at Byron Hot springs, California, was located on the grounds of an elegant spa bankrupted by the Depression. its new function began in early 1943.1 A “minuscule, though critically important” percentage of war prisoners would pass through these camps, about six hundred a month in batches of thirty to forty.2 The Provost marshal General (PmG) had custody of all PoWs and all camps except these two, for which his office merely handled supply and housekeeping—although he did choose their post commanders. Two chiefs of intelligence from G-2 (military intelligence, an agency of the Adjutant General’s office) controlled camp operations and handled liaison with the post commander, the FBi, and the office of Naval intelligence.3 This arrangement meant that G-2 doled out oNi’s share of rooms, microphones, 1 2 MURDER AND MARTIAL JUSTICE recording devices, and transcribers. At least oNi got first crack at naval prisoners and dealt with them according to its own rules.4 inevitably, this time-share arrangement caused conflicts. For example, prisoners were never supposed to see anyone but their interrogators and roommates. They were even fed in their rooms, which were bugged. oNi agents complained that G-2 hogged the recording devices, arbitrarily placed naval prisoners in unsuitable quarters with unsuitable companions, and allowed them to mingle in large batches.5 Cmdr. John riheldaffer, head of oNi’s special Activities (interrogation) Branch, had to play peacekeeper and turf protector with his counterpart, Col. Catesby ap C. Jones, chief of G-2’s prisoner of war operations (covertly named the Captured Personnel and material Branch, a subsection of the General staff’s military intelligence service).6 on one occasion, riheldaffer wrote Jones that since their problems were caused by “excess zeal” on both sides, he was sure that “frank discussion” and their war-winning “spirit of cooperation” would lead to complete agreement “based on certain fundamentals” (such as oNi’s paramount interest in all naval prisoners) and would overcome an accumulation of minor incidents (which he reviewed in detail).7 The Geneva Convention was another source of interagency conflict since the very existence of these two camps, not to mention the way they operated, violated “a dozen or so” of its articles.8 For example, Articles 8 and 77 obligated the Detaining Power to report a prisoner’s name to the international red Cross (irC) “in the shortest period possible” and to allow him free access to the irC and his Protecting Power (switzerland, if he were German or italian, spain if Japanese). Nevertheless, the PmG’s office laid down the rule that “no information will be released as to numbers, nationality, arm of service, source, or destination” of any prisoner, “until further orders from higher authority.”9 only after a prisoner was settled into a regular internment camp would his name, rank, and serial number be released and only then would he be able to exercise his Geneva rights. (The Germans also played this trick.)10 military intelligence found a useful loophole: since prisoners in transit were in legal limbo, the secret intelligence centers were attached to two ordinary transit camps. Thousands of prisoners moving in and out of Fort meade, maryland, and Angel island, California, thus provided candidates and camouflage for Fort Hunt and Byron Hot springs. The Vice Chief of Naval operations, who established the rules for the treatment of naval “guests” under interrogation, had no problem with this loose interpretation of the Geneva Convention. He declared that “our first interest is obtaining all information of value to us and any humanitarian...

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