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107 4 A State First, Immigration Later Operation Agatha ended; the troops returned to their barracks. Cunningham’s patience and persistence seemed to have borne fruit in both Britain and Palestine. The colonial secretary informed him with cautious satisfaction about a shift in the government’s thinking. The ministers now understood that the single-state idea was not viable, and given the certain objection by the chiefs of staff (Hall did not dare write that the Foreign Office, too, held the partition idea in low regard) it had been decided that the British delegation to the newly created AngloAmerican committee of experts—the Morrison-Grady Committee—would submit the provincial autonomy concept for consideration. That plan, derived from ideas put forward by Hall himself in summer 1945, would serve as an alternative to the binational idea formulated by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. American support would be sought for the plan. Cunningham probably smiled sadly at his minister’s convoluted efforts to explain why the cabinet saw an advantage in the provincial autonomy idea: it would show both sides that federative cooperation was preferable to full partition. The high commissioner could find some consolation in the report that the autonomy plan would be an interim stage on the way to partition. The cabinet had begun to grasp what the Peel Commission had understood ten years earlier: that the only tenable solution was one in which each side managed its own affairs. Hall also reminded Cunningham about the proposed separate political and geographic arrangement for Jerusalem, in the spirit of 1937, which would leave the Mandatory power with a foothold in Palestine.1 Cunningham replied that after eight months in Palestine and after having acquainted himself thoroughly with the problem, he was certain a binational state could not work. Without partition, there would be neither peace nor stability. This, he suspected, was precisely what some in the cabinet wanted. He asked Hall to pass on his personal opinion that partition should be introduced without interim stages, as they would only exacerbate the situation.2 108 A Political Process His efforts seemed to be bearing fruit. After Operation Agatha, the Jewish Agency showed clear signs of readiness to call off the revolt and return to political discussions. Like Cunningham, Attlee too believed that an unflinching policy against terrorism would help bring the moderates to the negotiating table. Cunningham, then, received quiet backing not only from the politically weak Hall but from the prime minister himself. His problem lay with the Foreign Office and the army.3 On July 8, just before the conclusion of Operation Agatha, Cunningham , concerned that some in London might undermine the results of the operation, proposed a short home visit. London asked why he was so eager to come to Britain when a new joint committee was about to arrive in Palestine. To this, the high commissioner, heady and confident thanks to Operation Agatha, replied that he was aware of the committee’s arrival and of the need to accompany it, and that his proposed visit would accomplish two ends with this in mind. He would be able to update the minister about the current situation—namely, the apparent success of Operation Agatha both politically and in terms of security—and he would hold talks on the “final solution” [sic] about to be proposed by the joint committee or the government. Feeling that he could promote the partition idea, he requested that a special plane be put at his disposal for a short excursion to London.4 On July 17, he was informed that a plane would be available on Friday July 19 in the morning, enabling him to be in London that afternoon. Nevertheless, he felt that his visit had not been approved unreservedly. He took exception to the draft communiqué of the Colonial Office to announce his visit, specifically to the sentence stating that in London the results of the recent operation would be discussed. That, he thought, might be construed to mean that the operation had failed and that he had been summoned for a clarification. Cunningham wanted the announcement to mention the long-term political solution, whose resuscitation had been one of the operation’s goals. London, for its part, wanted a compromise and flattered Cunningham by putting him up at a central hotel and holding an official reception for him. As for the communiqué, although it would not mention a long-term political solution, it would state that the presence of Grady...

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