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21. A Cosmological Proof for God’s Existence: From Morning Hours (1785)
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243 It seems to me that the distinguishing marks of whatever is contingent, dependent , necessary, or independent have been set out distinctly enough.12 Insofar as the reality of a being may not presuppose the reality of another thing apart from it, it is called “independent.” But insofar as its reality flows from its conceivability , insofar as the opposite—that is, such a being does not really exist—cannot be thought in and for itself, necessity is ascribed to this being. We say, “God is a necessary being.” That is, God’s existence flows out of His conceivability, and the opposite, or God’s nonexistence, is not conceivable in and for itself. Is such a being possible? There can be no further question regarding this, once we have been led through a correct chain of inferences that take us from our evident conviction regarding our own existence to the existence of such a being. The concept must contain the truth to which we are brought by the positive force of our faculty of thought. If something contingent exists, then something necessary must also exist and be as conceivable. I will try to present this proof in a way that, as far as I know, has never been attempted by any philosopher. Therefore, my sons, pay attention and let me know as soon as I permit myself a misstep because of a preference for my own thoughts! Besides the immediate sensation of my own existence, which, as we have seen, isbeyondalldoubt,13 Ipresupposethatthefollowingperceptionisanindubitable one: I am not merely what I distinctly know about myself, or, what is equivalent, more belongs to my existence than I consciously understand about myself. Even what I know about myself is in and for itself capable of greater development, greater distinctness, and greater completeness than I am able to give to it. This 21 | A Cosmological Proof for God’s Existence From Morning Hours (1785) 12. [Earlier in the Morning Hours, in a passage not translated here, Mendelssohn defines the “contingent” (Züfallig) as something whose “real existence does not follow from its conceivability” and the “dependent” (Abhängig) as something whose “existence is grounded in the reality of other things.” He defines the “necessary” (Nothwendigen) and “independent” (Unabhängigen) in what follows.] 13. [Mendelssohn follows Descartes on this point earlier in the Morning Hours, in a passage not translated here. See JubA vol. 3, pt. 2: 43.] 244 | m i s c e l l a n y observation, it seems to me, is just as undeniably evident. It possesses subjective certainty as a perception of inner sense. And since, with regard to myself, my own I is also the subject of my thoughts, what is known immediately can also be ascribed to me as a predicate. That I do not know everything that belongs to my existence cannot be a deception of my senses or an illusion, for, in the first place, there is nothing internally knowable that we bring forth in the form of an external object. We cannot combine the qualities of different senses, nor can we infer always from often. All of these things were sources of sensory illusion, as we saw in the preamble.14 And in any case, this illusion would itself prove that we do not know ourselves correctly, and thus that there really exists much in us of which we are not conscious. In fact, neither our body nor our soul would be able to exist if they were merely what we distinctly know of them. Now, I assert not only that everything possible must be thought by some thinking being as possible, but also that everything real must be thought by some thinking being as real. What no thinking being represents as possible is in fact not possible. Thus what some thinking being does not think as real cannot really exist. These propositions already seem obvious to common sense. Every possible concept is thought as the modification of a subject, as the thought of a thinking being. Therefore, it must at least have an ideal existence—that is, it must be a true concept of some thinking being. This was the first half of our proposition that every possibility must be thought as a possibility. But every reality, if it is to be true, must also be recognized and conceived by some being as a truth. A concept must correspond to the thing. Every object must be presented to a thinking subject, every image must be...