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ONE | Cicero’s Antonius Neither the bland prolixity of the Academics, Nor yet the painful pointlessness of Aristotle. Timon of Phlius, Silloi fr. 35–36, in Diogenes Laertius 4.67, 5.11 Listening to Antonius Roughly midway into the second book of Cicero’s great and complex dialogue, De oratore, as the orator Marcus Antonius begins his discussion of the role of “commonplaces” (loci) in rhetorical invention, Quintus Lutatius Catulus—an enthusiast of Greek high culture—remarks with approval that Antonius seems to be following the theories of Aristotle’s Topics and is less indifferent to Greek philosophy than he pretends (2.152).Antonius replies that an orator should show no trace of artifice, or of “things Greek.” He does, however, see no harm in “eavesdropping” (subauscultando) on the discussions of Greek philosophers, since it would be “brutish and inhuman” to take no interest in such themes as how to rightly live, think, and speak; and he admits that he has “briefly tasted” what the schools of philosophy have to say (2.153). In sum, he sees no reason not to listen to the philosophers a little, now and then, but he also sees no reason to study them in depth or even to pay them much serious attention. (He would rather read historians and orators; 2.60–61.) In effect he denies that his account of loci is really “Aristotelian,” even if it looks that way.And even, one might add, if many readers of De oratore have thought it looked that way as well.1 Catulus then objects that the Romans have always had a wonderful love of philosophical pursuits, and he invokes as “witnesses” against Antonius’“declaration of war against philosophy” the three philosophers who famously came to Rome on embassy from Athens in 155 b.c.e.—Carneades the Academic, Diogenes the Stoic, and Critolaus the Peripatetic (2.154–156). In their free time these three delivered lectures that greatly impressed the Romans, attracted crowds, and filled the young nobility with enthusiasm for Greek learning. In reply Antonius reiterates his stance: “I myself do not disapprove of those pursuits ” (ego ista studia non improbo) if they are “kept within limits” (moderata modo 10 | The Genuine Teachers of This Art sint);but he repeats that having a reputation for such interests or showing a tincture of them hurts the orator’s effectiveness.And then he makes the following crucial statement: Among those three most illustrious philosophers whose visit to Rome you mentioned, do you see that it was Diogenes who claimed to teach an art of speaking well [artem bene disserendi] and of distinguishing the true from the false, which he called by its Greek name, dialectic [διαλεκτικη ]? In this art, if it is indeed an art,there is no instruction [praeceptum] about how truth should be discovered [inveniatur], but only about how it should be judged [iudicetur]. For with respect to every statement we might make that something is or is not, if it is said without qualification, the dialecticians undertake to judge whether it is true or false; and if it is brought forth conjointly and other propositions are added to it, they judge whether these have been properly added and whether the conclusion of each and every argument [rationis] is true. In the end they pierce themselves with their own sharp subtleties, and in their investigations they encounter not only many problems that even they themselves cannot solve, but also previously woven webs of argument, and strong ones, by which they nearly are undone.This Stoic, then, is no help to us at all,since he does not teach how I shall discover what to say;and he actually hinders me, since he also finds many problems that he denies can be solved at all, and he teaches a kind of speaking [ genus sermonis] that is neither limpid, nor copious, nor fluent, but meager, dry, abrupt [concisum], and hairsplitting [minutum]—which, if anyone approves of it, he nevertheless must admit is not suitable for an orator. For this speaking of ours is adapted to the ears of the multitude, to charm and move souls, and in proving, to weigh things not in a goldsmith’s balance but, so to speak, in the scales of popular opinion.Therefore let us dismiss that entire art which is too mute when it comes to devising arguments, and too loquacious when it comes to judging them. I suppose that Critolaus, whom as you recall accompanied Diogenes...

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