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87 C H A P T E R 5 The Two Sides of Mimesis: Mimetic Theory, Embodied Simulation, and Social Identification Vittorio Gallese INTRODUCTION René Girard (b. 1923), French literary critic and anthropologist, has provided us with an incredibly rich and thought-provoking theory of human culture: Mimetic Theory. What is most fascinating in Girard’s Mimetic Theory is its broad and bold scope. According to Girard, human culture sits on the shoulders of religion, which in turn stems from the ritualization of social violence through the mechanism of scapegoating. As Girard wrote in Violence and the Sacred, “My theory is the first to offer an explanation of the primordial role that religion plays in primitive societies, as well as of man’s ignorance of this role.”1 Crucial in Girard’s theory is the notion of mimetic desire as the main source of aggressiveness and violence characterizing our species. In “Mimesis and Violence,” Girard writes: “It seems to me that a theory of conflict based primarily on appropriative mimicry does not have the drawbacks of one based on scarcity [of resources] or on aggressiveness; if it is correctly conceived and formulated it throws a great deal of light on much human culture, beginning with religious institutions.”2 88 Vittorio Gallese What is the appropriative mimicry Girard refers to, and where does it come from? It is the compulsive tendency of mankind to imitate others’ desires, so that what is really desired and sought out is whatever is desired and sought out by others. The intrinsic value of the objects of our desire is not as relevant as the fact that the very same objects are the targets of the desires of others. To further spell it out in Girard’s own words, “Violence is the process itself when two or more partners try to prevent one another from appropriating the object they all desire through physical or other means.”3 The novelty of Girard’s approach with respect to more traditional accounts of human violence is worth noting. Girard is very clear in drawing a distinction between desire and appetite.4 While the latter is the outcome of instinctual drives, the former, typically, not only requires an object, but also another individual, the model or mediator. Mimetic Theory therefore proposes itself as a key option for solving the problem of social cognition.5 An objection could in principle be raised against the apparently negative and one-sided view of mankind, in general, and of mimesis, in particular , stemming from Girard’s theory. Aren’t human beings, after all, equally describable as empathic creatures, capable of fellow feelings, love, and altruism ? Furthermore, one could argue that mimesis not only generates violence, but also art, culture, and creativity. However, although there is no doubt that Girard’s emphasis is mostly on human violence, the above-mentioned arguments would unfairly misrepresent Girard’s thought. Girard acknowledged in his work, though perhaps with less emphasis, that mimetic desire is also good in itself because it is the basis of love, viewed as the imitation of a positive model.6 Even more importantly, in my opinion, Girard stresses that “mimetic desire, even when bad, is intrinsically good, in the sense that far from being merely imitative in a small sense, it’s the opening out of oneself.”7 It is from this point—the notion of desire as openness to others—that I would like to start discussing some of the implications of the notion of mimesis against the background of Girard’s Mimetic Theory. I will do so in order to show how empirical research in neuroscience and developmental psychology can shed new light on intersubjectivity, a crucial aspect of the human condition. Girard’s Mimetic Theory constitutes an ideal starting framework to foster a multidisciplinary approach to this crucial topic. Capitalizing upon aspects of the work of Alexandre Kojève, Martin Heidegger, and Helmuth Plessner, I will first illustrate how we can envisage a different, complementary, not mutually exclusive account of mimesis as one of the driving forces leading to social identification, and hence to human The Two Sides of Mimesis 89 sociality and intersubjectivity. I will subsequently present a concise survey of empirical research in neuroscience and developmental psychology showing that this account of mimesis finds solid supporting evidence. A neuroscienti fically based model of intersubjectivity, the shared manifold of intersubjectivity and its underpinning functional mechanism embodied simulation, will be discussed in relation to social identification and mutual...

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