Embattled Ecumenism: The National Council of Churches, the Vietnam War, and the Trials of the Protestant Left

8—Campaigns, Confrontations, and Civil Disobedience, 1968

C h a p t e r E i g h t Campaigns, Confrontations, and Civil Disobedience, 1968 Politics and Theology As the new year commenced, so did the NCC’s election efforts. VAC’s strategy paper, “Renewal of American Dialogue: 1968” (known as RoAD ’68), provided practical suggestions for how churches could influence the political process without crossing the delicate line separating church and state. Alan Geyer drafted it with Eugene McCarthy in mind, for the senator hadinquiredifthechurchescouldpromotehisplatform.Theirinstitutional tax status prevented endorsements, and ecumenists were careful to protect the church’s independent non-partisan identity. However, religious groups could encourage candidates to adopt positions favored by the ecumenical community and, if successful, publicize the correlation. By involving itself in the 1968 campaigns, VAC hoped to advance three goals: a political settlement ending the war, greater investment in urban poverty issues, and a reorientation of national political priorities.1 VAC wanted to sway candidates toward positions favorable to these goals as well as promote grassroots support of politicians who shared them.2 It agreed with Negotiations Now! that a third-party antiwar presidential candidate could not win, so it focused on the two main parties. 200 E m b a t t l e d E c u m e n i s m VAC also steered clear of a “dump Johnson” strategy, which seemed too simplistic, negative, and personality-based.3 In addition, it discouraged a single-issue platform on the war, preferring candidates who were strong on a range of issues. And it advised church people to nurture potential allies among both Democrats and Republicans. This agenda demonstrated VAC’s loyalty to an ecumenical worldview rather than favoritism of any one political party, person, or pet wedge issue. RoAD ’68 urged widespread involvement in primary campaigns. Primaries allowed candidates to “test their strength,” “generate momentum,” craft their image, and build rapport with the public. This process provided a prime opportunity to influence candidates’ platforms. Therefore the UCC, with SADIA’s assistance, delivered a three-day training session in Washington, D.C., for religious persons interested in learning how to do so. VAC warned religious groups to keep the NCC’s name out of the picture. To reduce any appearance of clerical domination, it also urged them to stimulate as much lay participation as possible.4 And VAC counseled them to “strike a balance between radicalism and restraint, between prophecy and prudence” in their election activities.5 At a time when extremism and fearmongering dominated public expressions, ecumenists preferred using judiciousness and reason to influence the public square. on January 5, William Sloane Coffin Jr. gave a Protestant face to the stereotype of the radical antiwar cleric. yale’s chaplain was indicted for “conspiring to counsel young men to violate federal draft laws.”6 Back in october 1967 he had helped collect thousands of draft cards—for him, a faith-driven act of civil disobedience against an unjust war. He stood in good company. Baby doctor Benjamin Spock, Marcus Raskin, and two others were indicted as well. The ecumenical community rallied to his side. Christianity and Crisis published Coffin’s justification.7 Some, including Martin Luther King Jr., signed a “statement of complicity” with “the Boston Five” as they were called. In fact, all those who had signed CALCAV’s october 1967 “Conscience and Conscription” (that is, the “aid and abet”) statement could be considered complicitous. Elston, the first layperson to sign, heard that he might be arrested next.8 The NCC could help, Coffin said, by teaching how civil disobedience was a time-honored aspect of the Christian tradition.9 So the NCC created the new Staff Advisory Committee on Selective Service and War Resistance (SACSSAWR) to discuss conscientious objection, civil disobedience, and the draft.10 Elston and Dean Kelley served on SACSSAWR, as later Campaigns, Confrontations, and Civil Disobedience, 1968 201 would David Hunter, Burton Marvin, and Jim Hamilton of the NCC’s Washington office. Lack of official policy meant the issue needed to pass through the General Board first.11 This issue was touchy. As one committee member noticed, a selective Co policy would “require a reversal of [the NCC’s] habitual ‘liberal’ stance” that frequently favored government intervention in the lives of individuals.12 Despite its policy gap on civil disobedience, the NCC possessed sufficient precedent to provide legal support to young men denied Co status. Along with the ACLU, the NCC...