Embattled Ecumenism: The National Council of Churches, the Vietnam War, and the Trials of the Protestant Left

5—Taking a Stand [Includes Image Plates]

C h a p t e r F i v e Taking a Stand A Message on Vietnam to the Churches, July–December 1965 over the previous six months, the NCC had received a crash course on Vietnam and the secretive hawkish nature of U.S. foreign policy driven by its civil rights partner in the oval office. The Council’s instructors included the U.S. government, the Christian Century and Christianity and Crisis, American visitors to Vietnam, and Asians themselves. To date, the mild-mannered curious student had been cautious and, at times, reluctant to apply its learning. With the two ecumenical journals, Methodist leadership, and pacifist groups holding its feet to the fire, however, the NCC finally jumped into action just as Johnson escalated his troop buildup in Vietnam. on July 27, Ed Espy assembled thirty-three staff and denominational leaders from across the NCC’s constituency for a summit meeting. It was the first time the NCC had truly focused on Vietnam. Maxwell was not among them, but his associate Leonard Kramer attended. Espy asked those gathered for advice and counsel regarding a suitable course of action.1 American churches’ past ties with imperialistic foreign policy bred Asian mistrust, and this problem now hounded the NCC. For decades, religious groups had administered U.S. government relief efforts overseas because the government had goods and funds to give while religious groups possessed the structures, missionary relationships, and relief focus Taking a Stand 107 necessary to dispense them. During the Vietnam War, the government purposefully relied upon religious-sponsored relief work to help win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese.2 The NCC’s connection came through Church World Service, a branch of the NCC’s Division of overseas Ministries (DoM) and one of its most strongly funded, grassroots-supported entities. Church World Service, Inc., a nonprofit corporation, was registered with the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. Since the 1950s, CWS had become a major distributor of government-supplied aid around the world. In fact, it helped draft Public Law 480 in 1954, which made surplus food available for voluntary agencies to distribute in overseas relief efforts.3 It then partnered directly with the State Department’s Agency for International Development (USAID) in its “Food for Peace” program (also called “Food for Freedom”), which, according to CWS director James MacCracken, aimed “to utilize current United States harvests in overseas nation-building efforts.”4 CWS also accepted government funds and logistical support to conduct its relief work. CWSleadersvaluedtheirgovernmentsourcesandrelationships.However, participants at the July 27 meeting worried that, if the Vietnamese viewed the NCC’s relief activities as part of the government’s hearts-and-minds agenda, NCC credibility would plummet, both within and outside of Vietnam. Asian Christians wondered if the bond between America’s church and state was stronger than that cohering the Christian community globally. Norman Baugher explained that a prophetic verbal witness on Vietnam would hold little weight with the rest of the world if the American church’s image was still tied to U.S. foreign policy, and especially if it seemed a mere government lackey in nation-building efforts. Recalling the words of the Japanese Peace Team he said, “it must be imperative for the Christian Church of the West to have an image in Southeast Asia other than that which is represented by U.S.A. foreign policy and the presence of military personnel in that area of the world. If we cannot manifest a different image, the Christian Church is simply irrelevant to the people of that area.”5 Willem Visser’t Hooft, oftheWorld Council,also lamentedthis growing rift between Asian and American Christians as well as its negative repercussions for world ecumenism.6 Angry ecumenical representatives from the developing world had gained influence within the WCC, and the NCC began to pay heed. The NCC’s sense of its constituency, as well as to whom the credibility of its image was tied, was broadening from the American 108 E m b a t t l e d E c u m e n i s m white mainline population and government to include politicized persons of color, both domestically and overseas. Liberal denominational executives , who channeled funds to the NCC, encouraged this shift. Participants at the July 27 summit also debated several issues related to U.S. Vietnam policy, the proper role of the UN...