Cold Days in Hell: American POWs in Korea

4. The Warning

4 The Warning An arrogant enemy is easy to defeat. Mao Zedong During the last week of October and the first week of November , Chinese forces attacked and overwhelmed UN forces on both sides of the Korean peninsula, halting their advance and suggesting an important new factor in the war. The th Cavalry Regiment’s fate at the battle of Unsan, where it was surrounded and nearly destroyed by Chinese forces, provided an especially dramatic warning. The battle illustrated the Chinese ability to defeat American units in combat, and it resulted in several hundred American soldiers being taken as POWs, the largest group captured since the North Korean attacks of July . Unsan represented a significant new chapter in the war for both the UN Command and for several hundred American prisoners , who now trudged north toward internment camps through the frozen mountains of North Korea. Racing North By late October, UN forces were advancing north on both sides of the peninsula . Having entered Pyongyang on October , Walker’s Eighth Army now pushed toward the border at Sinuiju, where intelligence reports indicated that Kim Il Sung’s forces were rallying for a last stand. In Pyongyang itself, South Korean security forces executed several hundred alleged spies, traitors , and Communist Party operatives, exacting revenge for the thousands slaughtered by the retreating NKPA. The South Korean brutality evoked a stern protest from the British government. In the east, two ROK divisions raced north along the coastal highway toward the Soviet border. Offshore, the st Marine Division was preparing to land at Wonsan, followed by two US Army divisions. Finally, other UN forces were now arriving in Korea, including infantry battalions from Australia, Thailand, and the Netherlands, an infantry brigade from Turkey, and a second brigade of British troops. the warning 59 With the end of the war in sight, MacArthur issued new orders directing the Eighth Army and X Corps to “drive forward with all speed and full utilization of their forces.” Fearing Soviet or Chinese intervention, the Joint Chiefs had earlier prohibited MacArthur from using non-Korean ground forces “in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.” Now, without prior consultation, MacArthur dismissed that guidance. When asked to explain, MacArthur replied that the ROK Army lacked the combat power to adequately secure North Korea by itself, that his orders complied with subsequent guidance from the secretary of defense, George C. Marshall, and that he had discussed the entire matter with the president during the conference at Wake Island. MacArthur’s Confidence Here, as in several previous incidents, MacArthur demonstrated both a willingness to hear what he wanted to hear and a tin ear for the diplomatic issues at stake. Marshall had, in fact, cabled MacArthur on September  to “feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the th Parallel ,” but historian Bevin Alexander argues persuasively that Marshall’s intention was to authorize MacArthur “merely to cross it with as little noise as possible.” As for Truman modifying his instructions at Wake, we have only MacArthur’s word to go on. When reporters questioned him, Truman answered that he believed only South Korean troops would be advancing to the Yalu. MacArthur’s response infuriated Acheson, but with the general’s prestige greater than ever after the fall of Pyongyang, the Joint Chiefs declined to challenge the new order on the grounds that it was, as Bradley later said, “too late for the JCS to do anything about the matter.” The Wake Island conference had been one of Truman’s worst ideas of the war. Truman later claimed that his intent was to meet MacArthur in person because “I thought that he ought to know his Commander in Chief and I ought to know the senior field commander in the Far East.” In retrospect, Truman appears to have been motivated at least partly by his desire to reap the political benefits of MacArthur’s success prior to the midterm elections. Secretary of State Dean Acheson advised against the meeting, and both he and Marshall declined to attend. On the morning of October , the president met MacArthur on the tiny island in the middle of the Pacific. Although MacArthur failed to salute his commander in chief, the two chatted amiably, first in private and then 60 chapter 4 with advisors. There seemed to be no agenda for the group meeting...