Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-ni

Chapter 9 Isolated and Encircledat Chipyong-ni

C h a p t e r  Isolated and Encircled at Chipyong-ni The commander must show by his behavior that the “old man” is always on the job, that he sees that the rations come up in time, that the mail is never delivered late, and that he is always looking for better conditions so as to improve the lot of his men. If on all sides there is this common tie of service—of the commander serving his men, of the men serving the commander—this will be a unit truly formidable in battle. —Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor Courage, however, is that firmness of spirit, that moral backbone, which, while fully appreciating the danger involved, nevertheless goes on with the undertaking. Bravery is physical; courage is mental and moral. You may be cold all over; your hands may tremble; your legs may quake; your knees be ready to give way—that is fear. If, nevertheless, you go forward; if in spite of this physical defection you continue to lead your men against the enemy, you have courage. The physical manifestations of fear will pass away. You may never experience them but once. —Maj. C. A. Bach S ince his assumption of command in late December, , the Eighth Army commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, had wanted to go on the offensive against the North Korean Peoples Army and its ally, the Chinese Communist Forces. At Wonju in January and at the Twin Tunnels in February, he had experienced limited success. His goal was never so much holding ground as it was killing the enemy: He wanted to punish them with paralyzing losses through his strong advantage in artillery and aviation. On the other hand, the NKPA and CCF had not mounted an offensive in the five weeks since  January , when the UN forces had given up Seoul, but they had now launched a strong offensive in the Wonju region. On the eve of this Chinese onslaught, Ridgway had the advantage of having received the most thorough intelligence appraisal of Chinese and North Korean capabilities since taking command. In an Eighth Army estimate of the enemy situation dated  February , his intelligence officer had predicted that the lull in Chinese offensive operations would end when the enemy remedied their logistical problems. When their forces had reorganized their supply and transportation operations they would be ready to resume the offensive; that time now seemed to be approaching. In none of their statements had the Chinese ever backed away from the goal of driving the UN forces off the Korean peninsula.1 In this context, both Ridgway and Lt. Gen. Ned Almond, the X Corps commander, appreciated the d Infantry’s precarious position at Chipyong -ni. Even before the CCF offensive at Wonju, X Corps intelligence officers were speculating that the enemy’s Forty-second Army was in a position “to drive southeast past Chipyong-ni through the gap between the rd Infantry Regiment and elements of the th ROK Division.” Intelligence also indicated that the Chinese had “the capability of either turning southwest and enveloping the Chipyong-ni salient, or of continuing to the southeast to strike at Wonju.” In a separate report dated  February, the intelligence staff noted that the CCF forces northeast of Chipyong-ni had been further reinforced and were ready to start driving south. “It is becoming increasingly apparent,” the report continued, “that the enemy has noted the gap between the rd Infantry Regiment and elements of the th ROK Division and has decided to take advantage of this situation before the gap is closed.”2 After the strong attack at Wonju, the intelligence report became even more somber: The initiative has temporarily been taken over by the Chinese Forces. Although his divisions are inferior in size and strength to those of the United Nations, he has found gaps in friendly lines and has been able to penetrate and outflank positions on both sides of the X Corps salient. In order to give weight to this attack, he is employing elements of three [CCF armies], one attacking south from the Hongchon area, and two attacking to the southeast from the Chipyong-ni area. . . . The enemy capability of eliminating the X Corps salient is now a “fait accompli.” The decision to continue his attack to the south remains with LEADERSHIP IN THE CRUCIBLE  the enemy. Since he has...