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Part 3: “The Inability of an Enemy to Launch his Air Attack on These Islands Is Our Greatest Security”
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PartIII 179 p a r t i i i “The Inability of an Enemy to Launch his Air Attack on These Islands Is Our Greatest Security” Tokyo,Washington,Manila,andTakao: November–December7,1941 partIII 4/2/03,1:04PM 179 PartIII 180 partIII 4/2/03,1:04PM 180 [3.81.97.37] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 10:38 GMT) PartIII 181 AT THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE HELD NOVEMBER 5, EmperorHirohitomadehisnear-finaldecisionforwarbysanctioningthe completionof“preparationsforoperations”andapprovingthemidnight December1deadlinesetattheNovember1liaisonconferenceforterminating negotiationswiththeUnitedStates.Theemperorwasnolonger “agonized”overthedeadlockednegotiationsandhadbecomecommitted towar.Nowhewouldpursueastrategy“tostringWashingtonalong” untilthetimewhenheandhismilitarycommanderswerereadyforthe “showdown”withAmerica. Later that day,Admiral Nagano met with Hirohito to discuss the navy’s war plan in detail. Entitled“Imperial Navy Operations Plan for WarAgainsttheUnitedStates,Britain,andtheNetherlands,”ithadbeen drafted byAdmiralYamamoto’s Combined Fleet staff and subsequently submittedandapprovedbyNagano’snavygeneralheadquarters.Atthis meeting,theemperorgavehisfinalapprovalfortheHawaiioperationthat Yamamotohadfinallysucceededinhavingincludedinthenavy’splan.1 OnNovember6,ArmyChiefofStaffSugiyamaactivatedtheSouthern Armyanddesignatedsixty-two-year-oldFieldMarshalHisaichiTerauchi asitscommander.Terauchiwasorderedtomakeimmediatepreparations foraninvasionofthesouthernstrategicarea.Hewasprovidedwith“The Outline of Operations for the SouthernArmy” and the“Army-Navy CentralAgreementCoveringSouthernOperations,”onwhichtobasehis ownoperationsplan.HemetwithAdmiralYamamotoinTokyobetween November8and10inordertomakethenecessaryarrangementswiththe CombinedFleet.Hethensummonedallofhisfieldarmycommandersto ImperialGHQ/ArmyonNovember10andgavethemdetailedinstructions regardingthepreparationsthatneededtobemade. partIII 4/2/03,1:04PM 181 PartIII 182 Onthenavalside,ImperialGHQ/NavyOrder1issuedonNovember5 announcedthedecisiontoopenhostilitiesagainsttheUnitedStates,Great Britain,andtheNetherlands.TheCombinedFleetwasorderedtomake thenecessarypreparationsforwaroperationsandtoadvanceitsforces tospecifiedassemblypointsbeforethecommencementofoperations.In response,YamamotoissuedCombinedFleetOperationsOrder1thesame day,detailingtheplanhisstaffhadworkedoutearlierinsecretdiscussions withImperialGHQ/Navy.2 InWashington,ArmyChiefofStaffGeorgeC.Marshallandhisnavycounterpart ,ChiefofNavalOperationsHaroldR.Stark,metwithPresident RooseveltonNovember5todiscussamemotheyhadwrittenforhim regardingstrategyintheeventofwar.TheybotharguedforaGermany-first approach,withnocorrespondingunlimitedAlliedoffensivetobelaunched againstJapan.WithregardtothePacific,theytoldthepresidentthatifthey couldcontinuethePhilippinesbuildupuntilmid-December,anyJapanese forcesoperatingsouthofFormosacouldbethreatened.However,ifthey haduntilFebruaryorMarch,1942—bywhichtimePhilippinesairstrength wouldhavebeenbuiltuptoitsplannedlevel—suchairpowermightconstitute “adecidingfactorindeterringJapaninoperationssouthandwestof thePhilippines.”TheystressedthatwarwithJapanmustbeavoidedduring thebuildup.Inthisconnection,theyadvisedthepresidentnottoseeka declarationofwarinthePacificiftheJapaneseattackedKunminginChina, Russia,ormostofThailand.TheyrecommendedthatAmericagotowar onlyifJapanattackedordirectlythreatenedterritories“whosesecurityto theU.S.isofverygreatimportance,”whichmeantallU.S.possessions,the BritishCommonwealth,theDutchEastIndies,andsomepartsofThailand. Thestrategyundersuchcircumstanceswouldbetoremainonthedefensive ,holdterritory,andseektoweakenJapan’seconomy. Rooseveltconcurredwithhisservicechiefs’views.Thefollowingday, hetoldSecretaryofWarStimsonthathewas“tryingtofindsomething that would give us further time.” However, when Roosevelt suggested asixmonths’truceduringwhichtherewouldbenotroopmovements, Stimsonobjectedthatitwouldhalttheongoing...