Shadow and Stinger: Developing the AC-119G/K Gunships in the Vietnam War

9. Fulfilling the Contract and Deploying the Fleet

C h a p t e r 9 fulfilling the Contract and deploying the fleet o N 23 aPrIl 1968, as the tet offensive was sputtering to a conclusion, air Force logistics Command officials formally assigned item management responsibility to WraMa for the aC-119’s major component systems.1 Concurrently, Fairchild-Hiller’s management continued the development of its production plans while its workforce initiated the modification. one of the most important planning projects was the creation of the contractor’s reliability and maintainability (r&M) program for the total work package. on 15 May Fairchild submitted the plan to the reliability Engineering Branch at Warner robins for review. after several days of analysis, the experts at robins were alarmed to discover that “the plan did not contain any quantified reliability requirements.” It did not provide for the “testing of components, systems and subsystems” in order to specify the “required mean time-between-failure” rates. It also lacked “a clear cut procedure for identifying ‘critical items.’” Moreover, it did not include a list of the organizational personnel that were supposed to “manage and control the reliability program.” Finally, the plan “was too general” since it did not call for the “specific tasks and procedures necessary to assure minimum acceptance reliability requirements.”2 fulfilling the ContraCt, dePloying the fleet 1 as a result of these omissions, officials at Warner robins concluded that Fairchild-Hiller’s r&M program plan was inadequate to ensure that the reconfiguration would meet even the minimum reliability requirement standards established by the USaF and the DoD. this, along with other parts availability and acquisition factors, pushed the program behind schedule even as it geared up for the main production phase. as a result of this evaluation of the reliability and maintainability plan, the contractor and WraMa experts developed new reliability and maintainability standards and guidelines for the aC-119. this, too, delayed the production program.3 among the other factors that also held up the reconfiguration process was the constant disagreement among DoD and USaF leaders over the size and scope of the overall gunship fleet. Fresh on the heels of the various proposals of February and early March, on 20 March 1968 logistics and Systems Commands submitted a feasibility study to the secretary of the U.S. air Force, putting in their two cents on the composition of the gunship force in Vietnam. the study proposed increasing the number of aC-119Ks by twenty-six or more aircraft. By 30 april, Secretary Brown, apparently now weary of the dispute, instructed air Staff officials to inform Warner robins’s leadership that the aC-119G/K program “had been firmed by the Secretary of air Force to the original 52 gunship program.” apparently the numbers game was about to run its course.4 Much of this paring down of the number of gunships and other weapon systems came from the fact that tet was the beginning of the end of the United States’ commitment to the Second Indochina War. Indeed, the sobering reality of tet, whether intentional or not, was that U.S. force of arms could not defeat the enemy without a major increase in the numbers of troops and a renewed commitment, especially on the part of the american public, to stay the course no matter what the cost. this, of course, flew in the face of the growing belief in Washington and elsewhere that america’s time in Vietnam had run out and should end as soon as possible before it destroyed the socioeconomic fabric of the nation. the aC-119 Program Schedule these fits and starts soon materially altered the overall program schedule. WraMa had received its initial directive in February 1 Shadow and Stinger 1968 with the first delivery scheduled for 23 april 1968 and the first aC-119G deployments set for 1 July 1968. the previously mentioned delays eventually set the first delivery back to 21 May 1968 and the first deployments to early November 1968. as the planners scrambled to alter the milestones, other factors also added to the tardy deployment of the aircraft and crews. among the issues facing the aC-119 program managers were delays in the delivery and installation of the FlIrS. this was partly caused by the need to take sixty-six corrective actions, including additional testing, added training prerequisites, and weight-reduction requirements. Perhaps most annoying was the delay brought about by the USaF headroom—authorized...