To the Limit of Endurance: A Battalion of Marines in the Great War

Preface

Preface In August 1917 Maj. Thomas Holcomb assembled a new battalion of marines at Quantico, Virginia. Ten months later he would lead his men into combat. As Holcomb assessed the problem of preparing his command for the Western Front, he may well have believed he had everything he required: superb manpower, modern weaponry, sound doctrine, and, especially, plenty of time. But when the men of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines (2/6) waded into the wheat fields near Belleau Wood in June 1918, they were nonetheless woefully unprepared. The roots of 2/6’s shortcomings, the effects of the battalion’s misguided preparations on its performance in combat , and the course of its adaptation to the realities of the Western Front are the subjects of this study. The current transformation of warfare has encouraged historical interest in how armies adapted to change during the First World War. A number of recent historians have analyzed elements of combat effectiveness within the American Expeditionary Forces. Paul Braim, Edward M. Coffman, Mark E. Grotelueschen, Douglas V. Johnson, Stephen J. Lofgren, Allan Millett, Williamson Murray, Rod Paschall, James Rainey, Donald Smythe, and David Trask have all addressed the difficulties the AEF encountered coming to grips with a new type of warfare. These scholars have addressed factors such as inexperience , rapid expansion, incoherent doctrine, insufficient training, and occasional bad leadership.1 By focusing on a single battalion, this study provides an enlightening perspective on training, performance, and adaptation that suggests broader conclusions relevant to the study of the AEF and of transformation during war. In the Great War the infantry battalion fought at the sharp end of combat, living and dying according to its tactics and training. A battalion commander directed his men from the front, and his personal leadership affected every soldier. Importantly , the grim effects of attrition were most pronounced within an infantry battalion. Confining the study to a single battalion facilitates dissection and analysis of these factors. x Preface It is important to place this battalion’s experience in context. Only twenty-four U.S. divisions participated in what the AEF termed “active combat.” These divisions fielded 288 infantry battalions, of which the Marine Corps supplied only 6. The remaining battalions of the AEF were separately categorized according to their division: five divisions were Regular Army, eleven National Guard, and eight National Army. As a marine battalion, 2/6 benefited from service considerations distinct from those associated with these three components of the U.S. Army. Yet in many important ways, the marine battalions more closely resembled their best Regular Army counterparts than either of these professional organizations resembled the National Guard or National Army battalions.2 Marine battalions adopted the organization, tactics, equipment, and even dress of the AEF, while the quality of marine recruits and the backgrounds of marine officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) had pronounced effects on performance. The marines of 2/6 benefited from officers and NCOs as experienced as any in the AEF. The Marine Corps enjoyed a qualitative edge when selecting its recruits, all of whom consistently completed an uncompromising basic training. The First World War was a defining experience for the Corps, which earned a lasting reputation on the battlefields of France. While these service considerations may suggest lessons of note peculiar to the Marine Corps, 2/6 arguably represents the best that the AEF could be in 1918. Since by many yardsticks this battalion came as close to an ideal organization as any, and because it saw as much brutal and varied fighting as any, the odyssey of 2/6 provides an important case study on the readiness and resilience of all American infantry in the First World War. Despite its qualitative manpower advantage, 2/6 suffered from the same doctrinal malaise that affected all American fighting units. The Marine Corps had not adequately prepared its officers for the Western Front, and the AEF was hardly ready to remedy these deficiencies. The AEF had yet to develop a relevant tactical doctrine, causing the 2nd Division, in which 2/6 served, to adopt French trench-warfare tactics. Initially, the officers of 2/6 lacked the requisite experience to master the subtle nuances integral to these combat tactics. The AEF exacerbated the problem by burdening the battalion with an unwieldy task organization. As it developed, these tactics proved unsuitable for the type of fighting the marines would see at Belleau Wood and Soissons...