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i N the spring of 1949 the U.S. Army’s inspector general, Maj. Gen. Louis A. Craig, visited Eighth Army to check its state of training. In a subsequent report to Bradley, Craig identified significant shortfalls in Eighth Army’s readiness . Noting a general lack of skill on the part of junior soldiers, Craig laid some of the blame on the replacement training system and rated divisional readiness as low. However, he reserved the bulk of his criticism for officer leadership, not soldier proficiency. Many officers with whom he spoke felt that they had been abandoned, a feeling reinforced by the scattering of stations across Japan, and some felt little urgency to implement training programs. Drawdown-induced tensions between Regular and Reserve officers threatened to derail any attempt to build readiness. Reserve officers on active duty in combat arms units believed they were denied the same opportunities for advancement as their Regular Army brethren. Their voiced resentments appeared to Craig as manifestations of a lost professionalism or worse. Moreover, the IG found that service units in particular were blissfully ignorant of even the rudiments of military training . In view of these problems, it is not surprising that Craig took issue with FECOM’s adoption of a forty-hour training week when so much work needed to be done.1 In an attempt to repair the political damage Craig’s report would do to MacArthur’s reputation, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond wrote a rebuttal to his friend Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull, the director of organization and training on the Army Staff. Addressing his letter “Dear Pinky,” Almond quoted recent guidance from the Department of the Army regarding adoption of a forty-hour work week over five or five and a half days, and again cited the low AGCT scores 3 The Bumpy Road from Rhetoric to Readiness 29 30 of “an extremely high percentage” of recent replacements as an obstacle to training progression. Almond made no mention of the other shortcomings identified by Craig in his report.2 Almond would have better served his boss by forwarding to Bull a copy of Walker’s Training Directive Number Four. Eighth Army’s training guidance for the coming year provided detailed instructions for the training of both maneuver and support units. Alternately, he could have included the summary report compiled by a member of the FECOM G-3 staff concerning a tactical demonstration conducted on June 17, 1949, by the 1st Cavalry Division. This report outlined the short-term problems incurred by the leveling of units in preparation for Constant Flow, which in turn “tended to level off training, putting those battalions which were well along in training back into basic and small unit” phases of training. The demonstration unit, the 8th Cavalry Regiment, had previously spent four weeks at the maneuver training area at Camp McNair on the slopes of Mount Fuji concentrating on squad and platoon collective tasks. The observer reported good control of squads, adequate use of indirect fires, and high soldier enthusiasm. The report recommended additional training on the use of cover and concealment and on better coordination of infantry and armor units during offensive operations.3 This report underlined the effects of failing to provide branch-specific training to new recruits prior to their arrival in the Far East. Although OCAFF acknowledged this shortcoming, it was not corrected until July 1950. Until then it was the responsibility of the gaining unit to provide any individual specialized training required for job performance as well as to integrate the new soldier into his unit as a member of a team. Individuals trained at the replacement centers in the United States received no exposure to advanced subjects even under the revised fourteen-week program. Basic training as then conducted was designed “to give an adequate foundation on which to build individual and unit branch training.”This limited scope sought only to develop “willing obedience ” and “soldierly qualities” in the recruit.4 The actual training and certification of soldiers in particular military occupational specialties was left to the unit. This outlook placed a greater burden on units than on the training centers. The centers could focus all efforts on the initial transformation from civilian to soldier, while units were obliged to meet three simultaneous objectives: “first, to teach individuals how teamwork produces an effective combat unit; second, to develop cadres on which fighting units can be built; third, to produce in minimum time, smooth working units which are ready...

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