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65 The Leiden Years A Prelude to the Declaration 4 The foregoing chapters of this focused theological biography trace to a large extent the conflicts in which Arminius was embroiled. That will also be the case in this chapter describing the years immediately prior to Arminius’ appearance before the States of Holland at The Hague in 1608. One should not conclude, however, that Arminius’ life as a pastor and theologian was consumed with conflict. There were, to be sure, years of relative harmony, but the years characterized by harmony did not pave the path that led to The Hague Declaration. In the pages that follow, we will focus on the conflict between Arminius and Gomarus (1563–1641).1 Professional relationships with other theologians and within the university at large paint a more congenial total picture than a focus on Gomarus alone would allow. Amid multiple points of controversy among academics who disagreed over theological issues, Stanglin reminds us: “There were moments of collegiality.”2 This seems to have been partially due to the fact that there was agreement among them that a peaceful coexistence even amid disagreements was best for the church as well as for the university. When the disagreements threatened to flow over into the church and larger society , the professors took the unusual step, surprising to some observers, to issue a public statement of congeniality on August 10, 1605.3 The statement publicly affirmed that they “were not aware of any differences among the professors in the faculty that affected the foundations 1 Bangs, 244–48, gives a concise overview of Gomarus’ life. The BLGNP, 2:220– 25, and the BWPGN, 3:285–301, provide biographical dictionary overviews. The standard biography of Gomarus remains that of G. P. van Itterzon, Franciscus Gomarus (The Hague: M. Nijhof, 1930). Stanglin, 33, 243, points out that all Arminius’ colleagues in theology were supralapsarians, even if Gomarus was the most public of his opponents. 2 Stanglin, 28. 3 Works, 1:417. 66 Arminius and His Declaration of Sentiments of doctrine.”4 To this was added that they would be diligent to prevent such disputes among their students in the future. The reader is left to ponder what actually did happen to require a formal declaration of harmony among the Leiden professoriate when it was widely known that there were strong differences of opinion. This set of conflicts at the university was a prelude for what was to come.5 After Arminius accepted the Leiden post, he moved with his wife Lijsbet (nine months pregnant with their sixth child) in the early summer , 1603. As was the custom, public orations preceded his being awarded the professorial status of doctor in the acknowledged queen of all the sciences. These orations included: The Object of Theology, The Author and End of Theology, and The Certainty of Theology.6 These were delivered with the usual pomp and circumstance, and no issues were raised at the time regarding their content. As we will have occasion to note later, these orations are more foundational to Arminius’ theological agenda than hearers then or readers since have seemed to be aware. On July 10, he presented a closely argued disputation, “On the Nature of God.” The disputation was quite lengthy even by the standards of the day. In various accounts of Arminius’ life, teaching, and debates, those less favorably inclined to report positively on Arminius often accuse him of dissimulation, and even of hypocrisy in these early presentations. This public disputation would argue otherwise, for Arminius is clear on a crucial point about divine foreknowledge that distinguished his epistemology from that of many strict predestinarians , especially Beza and Gomarus. We can be fairly certain that he knew at this time that he was contravening Beza, and perhaps it only became clear to him over time that he had straightforwardly challenged a fundamental assumption in Gomarus’ epistemology. One of Arminius’ fundamental propositions centered on scientia media—a concept of “middle knowledge,” which asserted that divine foreknowledge does not predetermine that which is known. God knows all things, but some things God foreknows are necessary, whereas some things that God foreknows are contingent: “Though the understanding of God 4 P. C. Molhuysen, Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Leidsche Universiteit (The Hague: M. Nijhof, 1913–1924), 1:417. 5 The story that I relate here is recounted with much more detail by Bangs, 252– 93, and in less detail by Stanglin, 19–35, whose extensive footnotes are of special importance for specialists...

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