Religious Interests in Community Conflict: Beyond the Culture Wars

Chapter 10: Unity in the Face of the Faceless Clergy Opposition to the Ku Klux Klan in Northwest Arkansas

h 229 Chapter 10 Unity in the Face of the Faceless Clergy Opposition to the Ku Klux Klan in Northwest Arkansas Frankyn C. Niles Every time we come to town, something good happens. Because we came, all the church groups got together. —Jeffrey Berry, National Imperial Wizard of the Church of the American Knights of the KKK Whenever the Ku Klux Klan comes to town, there is apt to be conw w flict, especially if the town they come to is Siloam Springs, Arkansas. Struggling to distance themselves from lingering southern stereow w types, residents of this small (population 11,000) yet growing comw w munity on the ArkansaswOklahoma border remember August 5, 2000 as the day the Klan held a rally in front of City Hall. A local Klan member, believing the city was discriminating against him, invited Rev. Jeffrey Berry, the oftenwviolent leader of the Indianawbased Church of the American Knights of the KKK, to stage a demonstraw w tion (Hayworth 2000). In the months prior to the rally, city leaders asked members of the Siloam Springs Ministerial Alliance (hereinafw w ter referred to as the SSMA), an alliance of white, male, and primarw w ily evangelical ministers, to mobilize their parishioners to pray for a peaceful rally and to avoid the event altogether (Clergy Interview #6, hereinafter CI6). SSMA members heard the plea and, with an unprecw w edented level of unity, mobilized their parishioners to participate in a series of visible, yet peaceful, protest activities against the Klan. Clergy viewed their mobilization efforts as successful, espew w cially when compared to previous efforts to organize other parish 230 Unity in the Face of the Faceless activities, such as the National Day of Prayer and a series of Walks for Jesus (CI5). While the precise number of those who participated in the religiously sponsored events preceding the Klan rally was not tallied, most of the ministers estimated that between 20 and 25 percent of their parishioners were actively involved in antiwKlan activities. Perhaps most notably, only about two hundred spectators turned out for the rally, most of whom were from other communiw w ties in Northwest Arkansas. As one pastor told me, “We prayed that Siloam Springs, for the most part, would ignore [the Klan]. From that aspect, it was very successful” (CI1). That the clergy of the SSMA opposed the Klan is, perhaps, not surprising; local ministerial organizations (MOs)—formal or inforw w mal gatherings of clergy of one or more faiths in a community—have often spoken against racism and intolerance, making them imporw w tant avenues for social and political reform (Morris 1984; Wood 2002). For instance, in 1957 in Little Rock, Arkansas, MOs were instrumenw w tal in organizing resistance against antiwintegrationists (Campbell and Pettigrew 1959), while in other locales they spoke out against lynching (Miller 1957). More recently, clergy associations have been credited with helping end desegregation policies in hotels and resw w taurants in St. Louis (Djupe and Gilbert 2003), and in Boston, a black MO has created ad hoc committees for endorsing AfricanwAmerican candidates (Jennings 2005). What is puzzling about the Siloam Springs case is that the SSMA historically had not promoted social activism. Moreover, in the years leading up to the Klan demonstration, the SSMA had been largely inactive, with activities limited to monthly meetings and raising support for a local benevolence fund through offerings at a yearly community worship service. In fact, because of a lack of leadw w ership and clear vision, most ministers considered attendance at SSMA meetings to be a waste of time. One SSMA member explained: “We wanted to lead the community, but we weren’t doing it” (CI1). So, other than convening poorly attended and poorly considered monthly meetings, and occasionally promoting public religious diaw w logue, the SSMA had never engaged in social protest. This chapter aims (1) to understand how and why SSMA clergy chose to address the Klan rally and (2) to identify the strategies they used to mobilize their parishioners. I also explore how the threat posed by the Klan shaped the response of the SSMA to the rally, as well as the efficacy of that response. I rely on data from seven interw w Franklyn C. Niles 231 views with SSMA clergy, two interviews with local officials, and local media coverage of the Klan rally. Beyond these immediate aims, this case study offers an opportunity to...