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Notes PREFACE 1. In Uptown, I supplemented the open-ended interviews I conducted with interview data collected for a collaborative research project on Uptown by researchers from Loyola University of Chicago and the Organization of the North East (ONE). Although these interviews were based on a different set of research questions, they proved to be an invaluable source for understanding community dynamics. I acknowledge Phil Nyden, Joanne Adams, Maryann Mason, Josh Hoyt, and ONE staff and member representatives who conducted the research. 2. Living on the northern edge of Uptown provided me great access to the community. In 1996, I spent more than a month in Jackson Heights. During the same year, I rented an apartment in Fruitvale for two months. I made return trips to each community in the years that followed. INTRODUCTION 1. For a good discussion of the complexity of integration, see Hartman 2001, which includes a symposium entitled “Is Integration Possible” (33–90). 2. I acknowledge that the literature in this area has been quite mixed. See Rosenbaum et al. 1991 and Sigelman et al. 1996 for a more detailed discussion of the contact hypothesis. CHAPTER ONE 1. David Gordon suggests that manufacturers initially located their factories in cities to capitalize on an urban environment that gave them the upper hand in labor disputes. Because both heavy manufacturing and residential areas for its employees were located away from the central core, and individuals in nonindustrial or light industrial work were packed in or near the central business district, there was little opportunity for the two groups of workers to see themselves as potential allies (1984: 32–40). Industrialization segmented social and urban space in this way to prevent interaction among various groups. 2. Between 1910 and 1930, approximately 1.4 million African Americans left southern farms and cities to move north (Farley and Allen 1987). 3. Before 1900, the main way to restrict blacks from buying property was through deed restrictions on single land parcels. Restrictive covenants were devised to allow local real estate boards or neighborhood organizations to establish rules forbidding real estate agents from selling to blacks or anyone else whose presence was deemed “detrimental to property values in that neighborhood” (Massey and Denton 1993; Helper 1969; Trotter 1985). 236 NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 4. The second wave of southern migrants, greater than the post–World War I wave, brought a net flow north of approximately three million blacks between 1950 and 1960 (Farley and Allen 1987; Massey and Denton 1993). 5. For example, in 1942, 84 percent of white Americans polled answered affirmatively to the question “Do you think there should be separate sections in towns and cities for Negroes to live in?” and in 1962, 61 percent of whites surveyed agreed that “white people have the right to keep blacks out of their neighborhood if they want to, and blacks should respect that right” (Allport 1958; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). 6. Blockbusting has been described as a practice of real estate agents to exploit the color line for profit (Massey and Denton 1993: 37–38). Blockbusting agents would select a promising area for racial turnover, one that often bordered the black ghetto and contained older housing, poorer families, aging households, and some apartment buildings. Agents would quietly purchase a small number of homes and apartments in the area, renting or selling them to carefully chosen black families. Whites inevitably reacted with violence and resistance. Agents countered this with deliberate attempts to increase white fears and spur black demand, often going door-to-door warning white residents of the impending “invasion” and offering to purchase or rent homes on generous terms. As the number of panicking whites increased, realtors would advertise widely within the black community, quickly expanding black demand. Realtors would then inflate the price when selling to blacks. Given that most blacks were more than eager to escape the overcrowding and deplorable conditions of the ghetto, they succumbed to inflated prices, ensuring tremendous profits for real estate agents. 7. Both FHA and VA programs, by insuring up to 80 percent of the value of a property, lowered a lending institution’s risk and allowed the borrower to pay a low down payment, with the remaining principal and interest spread out over a twenty-five- or thirty-year period, making it possible for millions of white families to realize the “suburban dream.” 8. Between 1935 and 1975, the FHA insured about 9.5 million housing units representing a face value of...

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