In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Causes of Commitment 3 64 In some instances governments ratify treaties sincerely, in the hopes that domestic policy will follow their global commitment. In other instances they may feel pressured to demonstrate a commitment to policies similar to those of regional peers.In still other circumstances they may ratify merely to diffuse pressure from domestic or global audiences. Governments possess myriad reasons for committing themselves to human rights treaties, but do their reasons for committing to the treaties differ from their motivations for empowering their citizens with the right to file complaints before the UN treaty bodies? This chapter employs statistical analysis to test between competing explanations to this question. Chapter 1 argued for a reorientation of our understanding of commitment to individual petition among newly transitioning states. Governments at the helm of newly independent states have powerful economic motivations to respond to European or American policy recommendations. The desperate state of many transitional economies compelled leaders of these governments to look outward, seeking friends and alliances with powerful external actors. These actors recommended that new governments adopt democratic institutions and human rights policies consistent with those offered in the EU and the United States—altering the judicial system to eliminate executive influence, legalizing opposition party candidates in legislative elections, or resisting the urge to silence critical voices in the media. Ratifying human rights treaties without entering reservations, understandings , or declarations (RUDs) served as a cheap signal for new governments to temporarily appease the demands of these external actors. A compelling economic need—defined here as debt crises, currency crises, and banking crises—served as one of many factors prompting these governments to ratify treaties and embolden their citizens with the ability to file claims at the UN, and as a cheap way to embrace the policy recommendations of American or European actors. Causes of Commitment 65 This chapter tests the factors contributing to commitment to the individual petition mechanisms attached to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Does an unstable political environment, rather than economic need, encourage governments to commit to UN oversight (Moravcsik 2000)? Are governments that already offer human rights protections the most likely to commit (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Hathaway 2002; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996)? Do new governments learn the value of committing to global human rights norms and ratifying treaties from established democracies and other global actors (Wotipka and Ramirez 2003; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Reus-Smit 1997; Risse-Kappen 1996)? There is no question that governments commit to human rights treaties and individual petition mechanisms (IPMs) for a vast array of reasons.This chapter aims is to introduce one new possibility: that among newly transitioning governments, poor domestic economic conditions spur them to seek out cheap signals of their commitment to human rights. The statistical analyses that follow are derived from two populations of states. The first consists of all the countries in the world between 1967 and 2007, allowing us to tease out global patterns of state commitment of IPMs over time. The second explores regional models of commitment in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia between 1991 and 2007. Control variables are drawn from theoretical predictions in the scholarly literature. Data and Methods Briefly introduced in chapter 2, survival analysis is used to test the impact of economic crisis on commitment to UN oversight. Biostatisticians developed survival analysis to capture the likelihood that individuals survive the outbreak of a disease. These models allow us to compare the amount of time it takes countries to ratify (given that they have not yet ratified). Survival models have been used in the commitment literature precisely because they help to model the fact that not all countries have ratified in any given year, but may potentially ratify in the next.1 Employing a parametric log-logistic regression model is particularly useful because there are frequently years in which just one country accepts UN oversight . In nonparametric and semiparametric models, such as the Cox Proportional Hazard Model, a single ratification for an entire year makes it difficult to compare subjects.2 The log-logistic regression allows us to compare the factors contributing to commitment, even in those rare years where there is only a single ratifying country. The regressions estimate the following equation: ′ α+ β ′ α+ β λ λ = + ( | ) 1 t x t x e t x e [18.116.8...

Share