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THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER ADDRESSED armed conflicts of a separatist nature. Such armed conflicts share certain characteristics and are generally considered more difficult to resolve via negotiated settlement and in a sustainable fashion (Wood 2003). Separatist conflicts mobilize support around identity and its relation to territory. Consequently, territorial powersharing, including substantial autonomy in governance and security and economic matters, is among the most common demands and features of a negotiated settlement. Unfortunately, territorial powersharing tends not to prepare a population for more integrated social and political practices but instead tends to deepen the expectation of autonomy among separatist populations and those who fought for it. Territorial powersharing is thus difficult to reverse without violence emerging. I now turn to nonseparatist internal armed conflicts, which exhibit more diversity in the aims articulated by insurgent forces. These cases of recurrence also exhibit a range of levels of violence, from the deadly recurrences of ethnic conflict and violence in the Great Lakes cases of Rwanda and Burundi in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s to the relative skirmishes of East Timor and Haiti in the 2000s. The distinction used here between separatist and nonseparatist conflicts is increasingly seen as worth exploring in the literature (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Cederman and Gleditsch 2009). Nevertheless, it is not the sole relevant, or even the most pertinent, distinguishing feature among armed conflicts or their recurrence. In this chapter I distinguish among three distinct patterns of postwar violence that reflect very different manifestations of exclusionary behavior. Those patterns are inductively derived from my research, although the bases for them can be found in existing scholarship. The first distinction is between the “precipitating ” exclusionary behavior examined above that also applies to some nonsecessionist cases like Haiti and East Timor, and what I call “chronic” exclusionary behavior. The latter form of exclusion refers to a condition of severe exclusion of a social or ethnic group from access to positions of political power 5 Nonseparatist Recurrences of Civil War Nonseparatist Recurrences of CivilWar 123 for a period of several years. Usually such exclusion extends beyond access to state power to also include access to economic power and social opportunities. Recall that precipitating exclusion can take the form of either formal exclusion based on laws or written policies (e.g., apartheid) or informal treatment or behavior that systematically excludes a group from such positions. In addition, I argue here that the important aspect of exclusion rests on the dashed expectations of the aggrieved ethnic or political group rather than an objective or standard schema. This chapter argues that exclusionary behavior played a precipitating role in recurrences not only in Liberia and the four separatist recurrences analyzed above but also in five additional cases: Haiti, East Timor, Zimbabwe, Burundi, and Rwanda. In the first three of these additional cases, this behavior was “precipitating ” insofar as it was a trigger causally linked to the recurrence of armed conflict. In the latter two cases, Burundi and Rwanda, I argue that the exclusion was “chronic” and was generally considered the most important factor underlying the repeated violent conflict in those two interrelated cases. These nonseparatist cases also suggest the importance of a second pattern of precipitating exclusion: the exclusion of former allies or coalition partners after a successful rebellion. In most cases where newly elected or empowered postwar governments engage in exclusionary behavior, it is against former enemies or the social groups associated with them. However, in a small set of cases drawn from successful insurrections, exclusion may precipitate renewed armed conflict when postwar governments move to marginalize, exclude, or even persecute their former rebel partners. The two central cases analyzed here are East Timor and Zimbabwe, although such behavior contributed to Nicaragua’s postrevolutionary recurrence as well, and has been identified by Atlas and Licklider (1999) in Sudan and Chad. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the state’s reneging on an explicit powersharing deal in the territorial, political, or security realm constituted the principal trigger of recurrence in six of fifteen core cases. Of these, Liberia, the CentralAfricanRepublic,andZimbabwerepresentednonseparatistrecurrences. In the other nonseparatist cases of Haiti and East Timor, recurrence was tied to a failure to meet informal expectations for participation in postwar governance. Precipitating Exclusionary Behavior The dynamic of exclusion in the wake of an autonomy arrangement differs in important ways from exclusion from struggles that seek integration. Inclusion in various state offices can serve as both security guarantees for former rebels and as guarantees that political, economic, and social priorities will be taken...

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