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5 The Pré Carré Fortifying France’s Northeastern Frontier Introduction While the Ming Great Wall of China stands as the preeminent example of a strategic defense system, the other early modern case involves a rising power with great ambition yet suffering from a chronic sense of insecurity. The seventeenthcenturyFrenchPr éCarréalsomarksatechnologicallydriventransitionfromthe first three cases, essentially continuous walls, to the last three efforts of discontinuous lines of fortified strongpoints. Whereas in all the examples the strategic defense systems affect the adversary by reducing their leverage, the potential of the frontier fortifications in this case to enhance the formidable French army’s offensive potential is particularly worth investigating. It caused a vast divergence between French intentions and adversary perceptions of French intentions, raising a basic question: Could the French have signaled a lesser threat while still producing enhanced security, and if so how? In an era when positional warfare was dominant, a strategic defense of strong fortresses would inevitably affect the military balance. But what was the extent of their impact, especially given the emergence of extremely powerful siegecraft? Finally, for a leader and government hypersensitive to its security despite possessing the best army in the world, how do such frontier fortifications affect perceptions as well as future behavior ? Although involving a different political system and military-technology context, in some important ways this situation seems surprisingly analogous to the United States today, which suggests the potential for some interesting lessons learned. This chapter explores these questions by examining French king Louis XIV’s decision to establish a pré carré to protect his kingdom and its resulting effects. The first half lays out the decision context over the winter of 1675–76 upon which the king determined French strategy. With this background, the discussion analyzes Louis’ assessment of choices and his rationale for pursuing a forward pré carré. The chapter then outlines the 1680s expansion of strategic 158 Chapter 5 defenses from opposing the Spanish Netherlands to safeguarding France’s eastern frontier from the Germanic principalities and the Austrian Empire. The examination concludes by considering the impact of the strategic defense systems during the two great wars that dominated the last twenty-five years of Louis’ reign (the Nine Years’ War and the War of the Spanish Succession). Near the end of the latter conflict, the enemy had penetrated deeply into this barrier on the northeast frontier, but the time and cost required for advancement allowed diplomatic and military changes that ultimately saved France from defeat. More than thirty years earlier, in late 1675, a chagrined King Louis XIV had faced his first crisis after nearly a decade and a half directing French affairs. The Dutch War, promisingly begun three years before to promote the king’s gloire and punish the Dutch Netherlands, had exploded. Abandoned by most of its allies, France now essentially stood alone against the other powers of western Europe. The army would face this challenge without its two most distinguished marshals, given Henri Turenne’s recent battlefield death and the Prince of Cond é’s health-related retirement. Earlier in the year, a necessary sharp increase in taxes precipitated revolts in western France. Although limited in scale, such uprisings had not occurred during the king’s adult reign. He feared returning to the persistent rebellions experienced earlier in the seventeenth century.1 Even Louis’ personal life had entered a particularly turbulent time with the “three queens”— his wife, Marie Thérèse, and two favorite mistresses, Louise de La Vallière and Madame de Montespan—stressing the ruler.2 Confronted with these military, political, economic, and personal problems, Louis and his advisors contemplated how to proceed for the coming year and more generally how best to protect France. They essentially had three strategic options. First, despite the challenges, the monarch could press on aggressively attempting to defeat France’s enemies and establish dominance in western Europe . Second, Louis could abandon the war and surrender conquests to date in an attempt to restore the diplomatic harmony and robust security that he inherited in 1661. A final option involved establishing a pré carré, translated as either a dueling field or square meadow.3 A more conceptually useful, if less literal , translation of “ring fenced estate” has been suggested.4 That is, France could pursue a straightened frontier with strong fortifications that resulted in a more defensible position along the border with the Spanish Netherlands, the front closest to Paris. Two variants of such an approach could be pursued: abandon exposed locations...

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